2020-02-29 00:43:59 +00:00
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---
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layout: default
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title: Security Measures
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parent: Security
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2020-04-16 08:12:41 +00:00
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nav_order: 1
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2020-02-29 00:43:59 +00:00
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---
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# Security Measures
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2018-08-26 21:46:15 +00:00
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## Protection against cookie theft
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2019-12-05 20:52:04 +00:00
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Authelia uses two mechanisms to protect against cookie theft:
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2018-08-26 21:46:15 +00:00
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1. session attribute `httpOnly` set to true make client-side code unable to
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read the cookie.
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2. session attribute `secure` ensure the cookie will never be sent over an
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2020-01-21 00:10:00 +00:00
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insecure HTTP connections.
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2018-08-26 21:46:15 +00:00
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## Protection against multi-domain cookie attacks
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Since Authelia uses multi-domain cookies to perform single sign-on, an
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2020-01-21 00:10:00 +00:00
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attacker who poisoned a user's DNS cache can easily retrieve the user's
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2018-08-26 21:46:15 +00:00
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cookies by making the user send a request to one of the attacker's IPs.
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To mitigate this risk, it's advisable to only use HTTPS connections with valid
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certificates and enforce it with HTTP Strict Transport Security ([HSTS]) so
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that the attacker must also require the certificate to retrieve the cookies.
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Note that using [HSTS] has consequences. That's why you should read the blog
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post nginx has written on [HSTS].
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2020-05-20 22:03:15 +00:00
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## Protection against username enumeration
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Authelia adaptively delays authentication attempts based on the mean (average) of the
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previous 10 successful attempts, and a small random interval to make it even harder to
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determine if the attempt was successful. On start it is assumed that the last 10 attempts
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took 1000ms, this quickly grows or shrinks to the correct value over time regardless of the
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authentication backend.
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The cost of this is low since in the instance of a user not existing it just sleeps to delay
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the login. Lastly the absolute minimum time authentication can take is 250ms. Both of these measures
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also have the added effect of creating an additional delay for all authentication attempts reducing
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the likelihood a password can be brute-forced even if regulation settings are too permissive.
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2020-03-06 01:38:02 +00:00
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## Protections against password cracking (File authentication provider)
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Authelia implements a variety of measures to prevent an attacker cracking passwords if they
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somehow obtain the file used by the file authentication provider, this is unrelated to LDAP auth.
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First and foremost Authelia only uses very secure hashing algorithms with sane and secure defaults.
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The first and default hashing algorithm we use is Argon2id which is currently considered
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the most secure hashing algorithm. We also support SHA512, which previously was the default.
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Secondly Authelia uses salting with all hashing algorithms. These salts are generated with a random
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string generator, which is seeded every time it's used by a cryptographically secure 1024bit prime number.
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This ensures that even if an attacker obtains the file, each password has to be brute forced individually.
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Lastly Authelia's implementation of Argon2id is highly tunable. You can tune the key length, salt
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2020-03-09 22:37:46 +00:00
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used, iterations (time), parallelism, and memory usage. To read more about this please read how to
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2020-03-06 01:38:02 +00:00
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[configure](../configuration/authentication/file.md) file authentication.
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2020-05-04 19:39:25 +00:00
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## User profile and group membership always kept up-to-date (LDAP authentication provider)
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Authelia by default refreshes the user's profile and membership every 5 minutes. Additionally, it
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will invalidate any session where the user could not be retrieved from LDAP based on the user filter, for
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example if they were deleted or disabled provided the user filter is set correctly. These updates occur when
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a user accesses a resource protected by Authelia.
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These protections can be [tuned](../configuration/authentication/ldap.md) according to your security policy
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by changing refresh_interval, however we believe that 5 minutes is a fairly safe interval.
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2019-12-30 02:03:51 +00:00
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## Notifier security measures (SMTP)
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By default the SMTP Notifier implementation does not allow connections that are not secure.
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As such all connections require the following:
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2020-02-20 01:09:46 +00:00
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1. TLS Connection (STARTTLS or SMTPS) has been negotiated before authentication or sending emails (unauthenticated
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connections require it as well)
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2. Valid X509 Certificate presented to the client during the TLS handshake
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2019-12-30 02:03:51 +00:00
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There is an option to disable both of these security measures however they are
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not recommended. You should only do this in a situation where you control all
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networks between Authelia and the SMTP server. The following configuration options
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exist to configure the security level:
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2020-02-20 01:09:46 +00:00
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### SMTPS vs STARTTLS
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By default all connections start as plain text and are upgraded via STARTTLS. SMTPS is supported, however due to the
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fact it was basically considered deprecated before the turn of the century, there is no way to configure it. It happens
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automatically when a SMTP notifier is configured with the SMTPS port of 465.
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2019-12-30 02:03:51 +00:00
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### Configuration Option: disable_verify_cert
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This is a YAML boolean type (true/false, y/n, 1/0, etc). This disables the X509 PKI
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verification mechanism. We recommend using the trusted_cert option over this, as
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disabling this security feature makes you vulnerable to MITM attacks.
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### Configuration Option: disable_require_tls
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This is a YAML boolean type (true/false, y/n, 1/0, etc). This disables the
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requirement that all connections must be over TLS. This is only usable currently
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with authentication disabled (comment the password) and as such is only an
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option for SMTP servers that allow unauthenticated relay (bad practice).
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### Configuration Option: trusted_cert
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2020-02-20 01:09:46 +00:00
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2019-12-30 02:03:51 +00:00
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This is a YAML string type. This specifies the file location of a pub certificate
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that can be used to validate the authenticity of a server with a self signed
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certificate. This can either be the public cert of the certificate authority
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used to sign the certificate or the public key itself. They must be in the PEM
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format. The certificate is added in addition to the certificates trusted by the
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2020-01-21 00:10:00 +00:00
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host machine. If the certificate is invalid, inaccessible, or is otherwise not
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2019-12-30 02:03:51 +00:00
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configured; Authelia just uses the hosts certificates.
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### Explanation
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There are a few reasons for the security measures implemented:
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2020-01-21 00:10:00 +00:00
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1. Transmitting username's and passwords over plain-text is an obvious vulnerability
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2019-12-30 02:03:51 +00:00
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2. The emails generated by Authelia, if transmitted in plain-text could allow
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an attacker to intercept a link used to setup 2FA; which reduces security
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3. Not validating the identity of the server allows man-in-the-middle attacks
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2020-04-03 23:11:33 +00:00
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## Additional security
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2020-04-04 23:28:09 +00:00
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### Reset Password
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It's possible to disable the reset password functionality and is recommended for anyone
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wanting to increase security. See the [configuration](../configuration/authentication/index.md)
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for information.
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2020-04-03 23:11:33 +00:00
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### Session security
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We have a few options to configure the security of a session. The main and most important
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one is the session secret. This is used to encrypt the session data when when stored in the
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Redis key value database. This should be as random as possible.
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Additionally you can configure the validity period of sessions. For example in a highly
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security conscious domain you would probably want to set the session remember_me_duration
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to 0 to disable this feature, and set an expiration of something like 2 hours and inactivity
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of 10 minutes. This means the hard limit or the time the session will be destroyed no matter
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what is 2 hours, and the soft limit or the time a user can be inactive for is 10 minutes.
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### More protections measures with Nginx
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2018-08-26 21:46:15 +00:00
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You can also apply the following headers to your nginx configuration for
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improving security. Please read the documentation of those headers before
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applying them blindly.
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```
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# We don't want any credentials / TOTP secret key / QR code to be cached by
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# the client
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add_header Cache-Control "no-store";
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add_header Pragma "no-cache";
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# Clickjacking / XSS protection
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# We don't want Authelia's login page to be rendered within a <frame>,
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# <iframe> or <object> from an external website.
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add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN";
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# Block pages from loading when they detect reflected XSS attacks.
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add_header X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block";
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```
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2020-05-04 19:39:25 +00:00
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[HSTS]: https://www.nginx.com/blog/http-strict-transport-security-hsts-and-nginx/
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