authelia/docs/security/measures.md

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---
layout: default
title: Security Measures
parent: Security
nav_order: 2
---
# Security Measures
## Protection against cookie theft
Authelia uses two mechanisms to protect against cookie theft:
1. session attribute `httpOnly` set to true make client-side code unable to
read the cookie.
2. session attribute `secure` ensure the cookie will never be sent over an
insecure HTTP connections.
## Protection against multi-domain cookie attacks
Since Authelia uses multi-domain cookies to perform single sign-on, an
attacker who poisoned a user's DNS cache can easily retrieve the user's
cookies by making the user send a request to one of the attacker's IPs.
To mitigate this risk, it's advisable to only use HTTPS connections with valid
certificates and enforce it with HTTP Strict Transport Security ([HSTS]) so
that the attacker must also require the certificate to retrieve the cookies.
Note that using [HSTS] has consequences. That's why you should read the blog
post nginx has written on [HSTS].
[FEATURE] Support Argon2id password hasing and improved entropy (#679) * [FEATURE] Support Argon2id Passwords - Updated go module github.com/simia-tech/crypt - Added Argon2id support for file based authentication backend - Made it the default method - Made it so backwards compatibility with SHA512 exists - Force seeding of the random string generator used for salts to ensure they are all different - Added command params to the authelia hash-password command - Automatically remove {CRYPT} from hashes as they are updated - Automatically change hashes when they are updated to the configured algorithm - Made the hashing algorithm parameters completely configurable - Added reasonably comprehensive test suites - Updated docs - Updated config template * Adjust error output * Fix unit test * Add unit tests and argon2 version check * Fix new unit tests * Update docs, added tests * Implement configurable values and more comprehensive testing * Added cmd params to hash_password, updated docs, misc fixes * More detailed error for cmd, fixed a typo * Fixed cmd flag error, minor refactoring * Requested Changes and Minor refactoring * Increase entropy * Update docs for entropy changes * Refactor to reduce nesting and easier code maintenance * Cleanup Errors (uniformity for the function call) * Check salt length, fix docs * Add Base64 string validation for argon2id * Cleanup and Finalization - Moved RandomString function from ./internal/authentication/password_hash.go to ./internal/utils/strings.go - Added SplitStringToArrayOfStrings func that splits strings into an array with a fixed max string len - Fixed an error in validator that would allow a zero salt length - Added a test to verify the upstream crypt module supports our defined random salt chars - Updated docs - Removed unused "HashingAlgorithm" string type * Update crypt go mod, support argon2id key length and major refactor * Config Template Update, Final Tests * Use schema defaults for hash-password cmd * Iterations check * Docs requested changes * Test Coverage, suggested edits * Wording edit * Doc changes * Default sanity changes * Default sanity changes - docs * CI Sanity changes * Memory in MB
2020-03-06 01:38:02 +00:00
## Protections against password cracking (File authentication provider)
Authelia implements a variety of measures to prevent an attacker cracking passwords if they
somehow obtain the file used by the file authentication provider, this is unrelated to LDAP auth.
First and foremost Authelia only uses very secure hashing algorithms with sane and secure defaults.
The first and default hashing algorithm we use is Argon2id which is currently considered
the most secure hashing algorithm. We also support SHA512, which previously was the default.
Secondly Authelia uses salting with all hashing algorithms. These salts are generated with a random
string generator, which is seeded every time it's used by a cryptographically secure 1024bit prime number.
This ensures that even if an attacker obtains the file, each password has to be brute forced individually.
Lastly Authelia's implementation of Argon2id is highly tunable. You can tune the key length, salt
used, iterations (time), paralellism, and memory usage. To read more about this please read how to
[configure](../configuration/authentication/file.md) file authentication.
## Notifier security measures (SMTP)
By default the SMTP Notifier implementation does not allow connections that are not secure.
As such all connections require the following:
1. TLS Connection (STARTTLS or SMTPS) has been negotiated before authentication or sending emails (unauthenticated
connections require it as well)
2. Valid X509 Certificate presented to the client during the TLS handshake
There is an option to disable both of these security measures however they are
not recommended. You should only do this in a situation where you control all
networks between Authelia and the SMTP server. The following configuration options
exist to configure the security level:
### SMTPS vs STARTTLS
By default all connections start as plain text and are upgraded via STARTTLS. SMTPS is supported, however due to the
fact it was basically considered deprecated before the turn of the century, there is no way to configure it. It happens
automatically when a SMTP notifier is configured with the SMTPS port of 465.
### Configuration Option: disable_verify_cert
This is a YAML boolean type (true/false, y/n, 1/0, etc). This disables the X509 PKI
verification mechanism. We recommend using the trusted_cert option over this, as
disabling this security feature makes you vulnerable to MITM attacks.
### Configuration Option: disable_require_tls
This is a YAML boolean type (true/false, y/n, 1/0, etc). This disables the
requirement that all connections must be over TLS. This is only usable currently
with authentication disabled (comment the password) and as such is only an
option for SMTP servers that allow unauthenticated relay (bad practice).
### Configuration Option: trusted_cert
This is a YAML string type. This specifies the file location of a pub certificate
that can be used to validate the authenticity of a server with a self signed
certificate. This can either be the public cert of the certificate authority
used to sign the certificate or the public key itself. They must be in the PEM
format. The certificate is added in addition to the certificates trusted by the
host machine. If the certificate is invalid, inaccessible, or is otherwise not
configured; Authelia just uses the hosts certificates.
### Explanation
There are a few reasons for the security measures implemented:
1. Transmitting username's and passwords over plain-text is an obvious vulnerability
2. The emails generated by Authelia, if transmitted in plain-text could allow
an attacker to intercept a link used to setup 2FA; which reduces security
3. Not validating the identity of the server allows man-in-the-middle attacks
## More protections measures with Nginx
You can also apply the following headers to your nginx configuration for
improving security. Please read the documentation of those headers before
applying them blindly.
```
# We don't want any credentials / TOTP secret key / QR code to be cached by
# the client
add_header Cache-Control "no-store";
add_header Pragma "no-cache";
# Clickjacking / XSS protection
# We don't want Authelia's login page to be rendered within a <frame>,
# <iframe> or <object> from an external website.
add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN";
# Block pages from loading when they detect reflected XSS attacks.
add_header X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block";
```
[FEATURE] Support Argon2id password hasing and improved entropy (#679) * [FEATURE] Support Argon2id Passwords - Updated go module github.com/simia-tech/crypt - Added Argon2id support for file based authentication backend - Made it the default method - Made it so backwards compatibility with SHA512 exists - Force seeding of the random string generator used for salts to ensure they are all different - Added command params to the authelia hash-password command - Automatically remove {CRYPT} from hashes as they are updated - Automatically change hashes when they are updated to the configured algorithm - Made the hashing algorithm parameters completely configurable - Added reasonably comprehensive test suites - Updated docs - Updated config template * Adjust error output * Fix unit test * Add unit tests and argon2 version check * Fix new unit tests * Update docs, added tests * Implement configurable values and more comprehensive testing * Added cmd params to hash_password, updated docs, misc fixes * More detailed error for cmd, fixed a typo * Fixed cmd flag error, minor refactoring * Requested Changes and Minor refactoring * Increase entropy * Update docs for entropy changes * Refactor to reduce nesting and easier code maintenance * Cleanup Errors (uniformity for the function call) * Check salt length, fix docs * Add Base64 string validation for argon2id * Cleanup and Finalization - Moved RandomString function from ./internal/authentication/password_hash.go to ./internal/utils/strings.go - Added SplitStringToArrayOfStrings func that splits strings into an array with a fixed max string len - Fixed an error in validator that would allow a zero salt length - Added a test to verify the upstream crypt module supports our defined random salt chars - Updated docs - Removed unused "HashingAlgorithm" string type * Update crypt go mod, support argon2id key length and major refactor * Config Template Update, Final Tests * Use schema defaults for hash-password cmd * Iterations check * Docs requested changes * Test Coverage, suggested edits * Wording edit * Doc changes * Default sanity changes * Default sanity changes - docs * CI Sanity changes * Memory in MB
2020-03-06 01:38:02 +00:00
[HSTS]: https://www.nginx.com/blog/http-strict-transport-security-hsts-and-nginx/