fix(oidc): pkce sessions generated needlessly

Signed-off-by: James Elliott <james-d-elliott@users.noreply.github.com>
fix-pkce-flow
James Elliott 2023-05-12 22:33:09 +10:00
parent 2445b2e23a
commit ec47da1a79
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 0F1C4A096E857E49
3 changed files with 239 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import (
"github.com/ory/fosite/handler/oauth2"
"github.com/ory/fosite/handler/openid"
"github.com/ory/fosite/handler/par"
"github.com/ory/fosite/handler/pkce"
"github.com/ory/fosite/i18n"
"github.com/ory/fosite/token/hmac"
"github.com/ory/fosite/token/jwt"
@ -255,7 +254,7 @@ func (c *Config) LoadHandlers(store *Store, strategy jwt.Signer) {
RefreshTokenStrategy: c.Strategy.Core,
TokenRevocationStorage: store,
},
&pkce.Handler{
&handlerPKCE{
AuthorizeCodeStrategy: c.Strategy.Core,
Storage: store,
Config: c,

View File

@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ const (
FormParameterResponseMode = "response_mode"
FormParameterCodeChallenge = "code_challenge"
FormParameterCodeChallengeMethod = "code_challenge_method"
FormParameterCodeCodeVerifier = "code_verifier"
FormParameterClientAssertionType = "client_assertion_type"
FormParameterClientAssertion = "client_assertion"
)

View File

@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
package oidc
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"regexp"
"github.com/ory/fosite"
"github.com/ory/fosite/handler/oauth2"
"github.com/ory/fosite/handler/pkce"
"github.com/ory/x/errorsx"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
)
var _ fosite.TokenEndpointHandler = (*handlerPKCE)(nil)
type handlerPKCE struct {
AuthorizeCodeStrategy oauth2.AuthorizeCodeStrategy
Storage pkce.PKCERequestStorage
Config interface {
fosite.EnforcePKCEProvider
fosite.EnforcePKCEForPublicClientsProvider
fosite.EnablePKCEPlainChallengeMethodProvider
}
}
var verifierWrongFormat = regexp.MustCompile(`[^\w.\-~]`)
func (c *handlerPKCE) HandleAuthorizeEndpointRequest(ctx context.Context, ar fosite.AuthorizeRequester, resp fosite.AuthorizeResponder) error {
// This let's us define multiple response types, for example OpenID Connect 1.0's id_token.
if !ar.GetResponseTypes().Has(ResponseTypeAuthorizationCodeFlow) {
return nil
}
challenge := ar.GetRequestForm().Get(FormParameterCodeChallenge)
method := ar.GetRequestForm().Get(FormParameterCodeChallengeMethod)
client := ar.GetClient()
if err := c.validate(ctx, challenge, method, client); err != nil {
return err
}
// We don't need a session if it's not enforced and the PKCE parameters are not provided by the client.
if challenge == "" && method == "" {
return nil
}
code := resp.GetCode()
if len(code) == 0 {
return errorsx.WithStack(fosite.ErrServerError.WithDebug("The PKCE handler must be loaded after the authorize code handler."))
}
signature := c.AuthorizeCodeStrategy.AuthorizeCodeSignature(ctx, code)
if err := c.Storage.CreatePKCERequestSession(ctx, signature, ar.Sanitize([]string{
FormParameterCodeChallenge,
FormParameterCodeChallengeMethod,
})); err != nil {
return errorsx.WithStack(fosite.ErrServerError.WithWrap(err).WithDebug(err.Error()))
}
return nil
}
func (c *handlerPKCE) validate(ctx context.Context, challenge, method string, client fosite.Client) error {
if challenge == "" {
// If the server requires Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE) by OAuth
// clients and the client does not send the "code_challenge" in
// the request, the authorization endpoint MUST return the authorization
// error response with the "error" value set to "invalid_request". The
// "error_description" or the response of "error_uri" SHOULD explain the
// nature of error, e.g., code challenge required.
return c.validateNoPKCE(ctx, client)
}
// If the server supporting PKCE does not support the requested
// transformation, the authorization endpoint MUST return the
// authorization error response with "error" value set to
// "invalid_request". The "error_description" or the response of
// "error_uri" SHOULD explain the nature of error, e.g., transform
// algorithm not supported.
switch method {
case PKCEChallengeMethodSHA256:
break
case PKCEChallengeMethodPlain:
fallthrough
case "":
if !c.Config.GetEnablePKCEPlainChallengeMethod(ctx) {
return errorsx.WithStack(fosite.ErrInvalidRequest.
WithHint("Clients must use code_challenge_method=S256, plain is not allowed.").
WithDebug("The server is configured in a way that enforces PKCE S256 as challenge method for clients."))
}
default:
return errorsx.WithStack(fosite.ErrInvalidRequest.
WithHint("The code_challenge_method is not supported, use S256 instead."))
}
return nil
}
func (c *handlerPKCE) validateNoPKCE(ctx context.Context, client fosite.Client) error {
if c.Config.GetEnforcePKCE(ctx) {
return errorsx.WithStack(fosite.ErrInvalidRequest.
WithHint("Clients must include a code_challenge when performing the authorize code flow, but it is missing.").
WithDebug("The server is configured in a way that enforces PKCE for clients."))
}
if c.Config.GetEnforcePKCEForPublicClients(ctx) && client.IsPublic() {
return errorsx.WithStack(fosite.ErrInvalidRequest.
WithHint("This client must include a code_challenge when performing the authorize code flow, but it is missing.").
WithDebug("The server is configured in a way that enforces PKCE for this client."))
}
if c, ok := client.(Client); ok && c.GetPKCEEnforcement() {
return errorsx.WithStack(fosite.ErrInvalidRequest.
WithHint("Clients must include a code_challenge when performing the authorize code flow, but it is missing.").
WithDebug("The client is configured in a way that enforces PKCE."))
}
return nil
}
func (c *handlerPKCE) HandleTokenEndpointRequest(ctx context.Context, request fosite.AccessRequester) error {
if !c.CanHandleTokenEndpointRequest(ctx, request) {
return errorsx.WithStack(fosite.ErrUnknownRequest)
}
// code_verifier
// REQUIRED. Code verifier
//
// The "code_challenge_method" is bound to the Authorization Code when
// the Authorization Code is issued. That is the method that the token
// endpoint MUST use to verify the "code_verifier".
verifier := request.GetRequestForm().Get(FormParameterCodeCodeVerifier)
code := request.GetRequestForm().Get(ResponseTypeAuthorizationCodeFlow)
signature := c.AuthorizeCodeStrategy.AuthorizeCodeSignature(ctx, code)
pkceRequest, err := c.Storage.GetPKCERequestSession(ctx, signature, request.GetSession())
if errors.Is(err, fosite.ErrNotFound) {
if verifier == "" {
return c.validateNoPKCE(ctx, request.GetClient())
}
return errorsx.WithStack(fosite.ErrInvalidGrant.WithHint("Unable to find initial PKCE data tied to this request").WithWrap(err).WithDebug(err.Error()))
} else if err != nil {
return errorsx.WithStack(fosite.ErrServerError.WithWrap(err).WithDebug(err.Error()))
}
if err := c.Storage.DeletePKCERequestSession(ctx, signature); err != nil {
return errorsx.WithStack(fosite.ErrServerError.WithWrap(err).WithDebug(err.Error()))
}
challenge := pkceRequest.GetRequestForm().Get(FormParameterCodeChallenge)
method := pkceRequest.GetRequestForm().Get(FormParameterCodeChallengeMethod)
client := pkceRequest.GetClient()
if err := c.validate(ctx, challenge, method, client); err != nil {
return err
}
if !c.Config.GetEnforcePKCE(ctx) && challenge == "" && verifier == "" {
return nil
}
// NOTE: The code verifier SHOULD have enough entropy to make it
// impractical to guess the value. It is RECOMMENDED that the output of
// a suitable random number generator be used to create a 32-octet
// sequence. The octet sequence is then base64url-encoded to produce a
// 43-octet URL safe string to use as the code verifier.
// Validation
if len(verifier) < 43 {
return errorsx.WithStack(fosite.ErrInvalidGrant.
WithHint("The PKCE code verifier must be at least 43 characters."))
} else if len(verifier) > 128 {
return errorsx.WithStack(fosite.ErrInvalidGrant.
WithHint("The PKCE code verifier can not be longer than 128 characters."))
} else if verifierWrongFormat.MatchString(verifier) {
return errorsx.WithStack(fosite.ErrInvalidGrant.
WithHint("The PKCE code verifier must only contain [a-Z], [0-9], '-', '.', '_', '~'."))
}
// Upon receipt of the request at the token endpoint, the server
// verifies it by calculating the code challenge from the received
// "code_verifier" and comparing it with the previously associated
// "code_challenge", after first transforming it according to the
// "code_challenge_method" method specified by the client.
//
// If the "code_challenge_method" from Section 4.3 was "S256", the
// received "code_verifier" is hashed by SHA-256, base64url-encoded, and
// then compared to the "code_challenge", i.e.:
//
// BASE64URL-ENCODE(SHA256(ASCII(code_verifier))) == code_challenge
//
// If the "code_challenge_method" from Section 4.3 was "plain", they are
// compared directly, i.e.:
//
// code_verifier == code_challenge.
//
// If the values are equal, the token endpoint MUST continue processing
// as normal (as defined by OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]). If the values are not
// equal, an error response indicating "invalid_grant" as described in
// Section 5.2 of [RFC6749] MUST be returned.
switch method {
case PKCEChallengeMethodSHA256:
hash := sha256.New()
if _, err := hash.Write([]byte(verifier)); err != nil {
return errorsx.WithStack(fosite.ErrServerError.WithWrap(err).WithDebug(err.Error()))
}
if base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(hash.Sum([]byte{})) != challenge {
return errorsx.WithStack(fosite.ErrInvalidGrant.
WithHint("The PKCE code challenge did not match the code verifier."))
}
break
case PKCEChallengeMethodPlain:
fallthrough
default:
if verifier != challenge {
return errorsx.WithStack(fosite.ErrInvalidGrant.
WithHint("The PKCE code challenge did not match the code verifier."))
}
}
return nil
}
func (c *handlerPKCE) PopulateTokenEndpointResponse(ctx context.Context, requester fosite.AccessRequester, responder fosite.AccessResponder) error {
return nil
}
func (c *handlerPKCE) CanSkipClientAuth(ctx context.Context, requester fosite.AccessRequester) bool {
return false
}
func (c *handlerPKCE) CanHandleTokenEndpointRequest(ctx context.Context, requester fosite.AccessRequester) bool {
// grant_type REQUIRED.
// Value MUST be set to "authorization_code"
return requester.GetGrantTypes().ExactOne(GrantTypeAuthorizationCode)
}