2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
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# yamllint disable rule:comments-indentation
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---
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###############################################################################
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# Authelia Configuration #
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###############################################################################
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2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
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2021-12-02 04:50:05 +00:00
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## Note: the container by default expects to find this file at /config/configuration.yml.
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feat(session): add redis sentinel provider (#1768)
* feat(session): add redis sentinel provider
* refactor(session): use int for ports as per go standards
* refactor(configuration): adjust tests and validation
* refactor(configuration): add err format consts
* refactor(configuration): explicitly map redis structs
* refactor(session): merge redis/redis sentinel providers
* refactor(session): add additional checks to redis providers
* feat(session): add redis cluster provider
* fix: update config for new values
* fix: provide nil certpool to affected tests/mocks
* test: add additional tests to cover uncovered code
* docs: expand explanation of host and nodes relation for redis
* ci: add redis-sentinel to suite highavailability, add redis-sentinel quorum
* fix(session): sentinel password
* test: use redis alpine library image for redis sentinel, use expose instead of ports, use redis ip, adjust redis ip range, adjust redis config
* test: make entrypoint.sh executable, fix entrypoint.sh if/elif
* test: add redis failover tests
* test: defer docker start, adjust sleep, attempt logout before login, attempt visit before login and tune timeouts, add additional logging
* test: add sentinel integration test
* test: add secondary node failure to tests, fix password usage, bump test timeout, add sleep
* feat: use sentinel failover cluster
* fix: renamed addrs to sentineladdrs upstream
* test(session): sentinel failover
* test: add redis standard back into testing
* test: move redis standalone test to traefik2
* fix/docs: apply suggestions from code review
2021-03-09 23:03:05 +00:00
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## Certificates directory specifies where Authelia will load trusted certificates (public portion) from in addition to
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## the system certificates store.
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## They should be in base64 format, and have one of the following extensions: *.cer, *.crt, *.pem.
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2021-11-15 08:37:58 +00:00
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# certificates_directory: /config/certificates/
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feat(session): add redis sentinel provider (#1768)
* feat(session): add redis sentinel provider
* refactor(session): use int for ports as per go standards
* refactor(configuration): adjust tests and validation
* refactor(configuration): add err format consts
* refactor(configuration): explicitly map redis structs
* refactor(session): merge redis/redis sentinel providers
* refactor(session): add additional checks to redis providers
* feat(session): add redis cluster provider
* fix: update config for new values
* fix: provide nil certpool to affected tests/mocks
* test: add additional tests to cover uncovered code
* docs: expand explanation of host and nodes relation for redis
* ci: add redis-sentinel to suite highavailability, add redis-sentinel quorum
* fix(session): sentinel password
* test: use redis alpine library image for redis sentinel, use expose instead of ports, use redis ip, adjust redis ip range, adjust redis config
* test: make entrypoint.sh executable, fix entrypoint.sh if/elif
* test: add redis failover tests
* test: defer docker start, adjust sleep, attempt logout before login, attempt visit before login and tune timeouts, add additional logging
* test: add sentinel integration test
* test: add secondary node failure to tests, fix password usage, bump test timeout, add sleep
* feat: use sentinel failover cluster
* fix: renamed addrs to sentineladdrs upstream
* test(session): sentinel failover
* test: add redis standard back into testing
* test: move redis standalone test to traefik2
* fix/docs: apply suggestions from code review
2021-03-09 23:03:05 +00:00
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2021-06-17 06:42:03 +00:00
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## The theme to display: light, dark, grey, auto.
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2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
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theme: light
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2021-08-02 11:55:30 +00:00
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## The secret used to generate JWT tokens when validating user identity by email confirmation. JWT Secret can also be
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2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
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## set using a secret: https://www.authelia.com/c/secrets
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2021-08-02 11:55:30 +00:00
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jwt_secret: a_very_important_secret
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## Default redirection URL
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##
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## If user tries to authenticate without any referer, Authelia does not know where to redirect the user to at the end
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## of the authentication process. This parameter allows you to specify the default redirection URL Authelia will use
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## in such a case.
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##
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## Note: this parameter is optional. If not provided, user won't be redirected upon successful authentication.
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default_redirection_url: https://home.example.com/
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2022-04-17 23:58:24 +00:00
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## Set the default 2FA method for new users and for when a user has a preferred method configured that has been
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## disabled. This setting must be a method that is enabled.
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## Options are totp, webauthn, mobile_push.
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default_2fa_method: ""
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2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
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##
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## Server Configuration
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##
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2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
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server:
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2021-08-03 09:55:21 +00:00
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2021-08-02 11:55:30 +00:00
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## The address to listen on.
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host: 0.0.0.0
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## The port to listen on.
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port: 9091
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2021-08-03 09:55:21 +00:00
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## Set the single level path Authelia listens on.
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## Must be alphanumeric chars and should not contain any slashes.
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path: ""
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2021-08-02 11:55:30 +00:00
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2021-11-15 08:37:58 +00:00
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## Set the path on disk to Authelia assets.
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## Useful to allow overriding of specific static assets.
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# asset_path: /config/assets/
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2021-06-01 04:09:50 +00:00
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## Enables the pprof endpoint.
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enable_pprof: false
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## Enables the expvars endpoint.
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enable_expvars: false
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2021-08-05 04:02:07 +00:00
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## Disables writing the health check vars to /app/.healthcheck.env which makes healthcheck.sh return exit code 0.
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## This is disabled by default if either /app/.healthcheck.env or /app/healthcheck.sh do not exist.
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disable_healthcheck: false
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2021-08-03 09:55:21 +00:00
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## Authelia by default doesn't accept TLS communication on the server port. This section overrides this behaviour.
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tls:
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## The path to the DER base64/PEM format private key.
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key: ""
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## The path to the DER base64/PEM format public certificate.
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certificate: ""
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2022-04-04 23:57:47 +00:00
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## The list of certificates for client authentication.
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client_certificates: []
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2022-02-20 23:14:09 +00:00
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## Server headers configuration/customization.
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headers:
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## The CSP Template. Read the docs.
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csp_template: ""
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2022-08-08 21:50:12 +00:00
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## Server Buffers configuration.
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# buffers:
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## Buffers usually should be configured to be the same value.
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## Explanation at https://www.authelia.com/c/server#buffer-sizes
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## Read buffer size adjusts the server's max incoming request size in bytes.
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## Write buffer size does the same for outgoing responses.
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## Read buffer.
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# read: 4096
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## Write buffer.
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# write: 4096
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## Server Timeouts configuration.
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# timeouts:
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## Read timeout.
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2022-10-07 02:52:01 +00:00
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# read: 6s
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2022-08-08 21:50:12 +00:00
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## Write timeout.
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2022-10-07 02:52:01 +00:00
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# write: 6s
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2022-08-08 21:50:12 +00:00
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## Idle timeout.
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# idle: 30s
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2021-08-03 09:55:21 +00:00
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##
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## Log Configuration
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##
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2021-06-08 13:15:43 +00:00
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log:
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## Level of verbosity for logs: info, debug, trace.
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2021-06-01 04:09:50 +00:00
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level: debug
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2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
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2021-06-01 04:09:50 +00:00
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## Format the logs are written as: json, text.
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# format: json
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2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
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2021-06-01 04:09:50 +00:00
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## File path where the logs will be written. If not set logs are written to stdout.
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# file_path: /config/authelia.log
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2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
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2021-06-01 04:09:50 +00:00
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## Whether to also log to stdout when a log_file_path is defined.
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# keep_stdout: false
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2021-05-31 04:02:54 +00:00
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2022-06-14 07:20:13 +00:00
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##
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## Telemetry Configuration
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##
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telemetry:
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##
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## Metrics Configuration
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##
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metrics:
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## Enable Metrics.
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enabled: false
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## The address to listen on for metrics. This should be on a different port to the main server.port value.
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2022-07-05 04:43:12 +00:00
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address: tcp://0.0.0.0:9959
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2022-06-14 07:20:13 +00:00
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2022-08-08 21:50:12 +00:00
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## Metrics Server Buffers configuration.
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# buffers:
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## Read buffer.
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# read: 4096
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## Write buffer.
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# write: 4096
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## Metrics Server Timeouts configuration.
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# timeouts:
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## Read timeout.
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2022-10-07 02:52:01 +00:00
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# read: 6s
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2022-08-08 21:50:12 +00:00
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## Write timeout.
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2022-10-07 02:52:01 +00:00
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# write: 6s
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2022-08-08 21:50:12 +00:00
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## Idle timeout.
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# idle: 30s
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2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
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##
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## TOTP Configuration
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##
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## Parameters used for TOTP generation.
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2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
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totp:
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2022-03-03 11:20:43 +00:00
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## Disable TOTP.
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disable: false
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2021-12-01 12:11:29 +00:00
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## The issuer name displayed in the Authenticator application of your choice.
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2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
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issuer: authelia.com
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2021-12-01 12:11:29 +00:00
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## The TOTP algorithm to use.
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## It is CRITICAL you read the documentation before changing this option:
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2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
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## https://www.authelia.com/c/totp#algorithm
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2021-12-01 12:11:29 +00:00
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algorithm: sha1
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## The number of digits a user has to input. Must either be 6 or 8.
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## Changing this option only affects newly generated TOTP configurations.
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## It is CRITICAL you read the documentation before changing this option:
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2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
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## https://www.authelia.com/c/totp#digits
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2021-12-01 12:11:29 +00:00
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digits: 6
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## The period in seconds a one-time password is valid for.
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## Changing this option only affects newly generated TOTP configurations.
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2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
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period: 30
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2021-12-01 12:11:29 +00:00
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2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
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## The skew controls number of one-time passwords either side of the current one that are valid.
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## Warning: before changing skew read the docs link below.
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2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
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skew: 1
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2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
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## See: https://www.authelia.com/c/totp#input-validation to read
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## the documentation.
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2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
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2022-04-07 23:01:01 +00:00
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## The size of the generated shared secrets. Default is 32 and is sufficient in most use cases, minimum is 20.
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secret_size: 32
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2022-03-03 11:20:43 +00:00
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##
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## WebAuthn Configuration
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##
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## Parameters used for WebAuthn.
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webauthn:
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## Disable Webauthn.
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disable: false
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## Adjust the interaction timeout for Webauthn dialogues.
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timeout: 60s
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## The display name the browser should show the user for when using Webauthn to login/register.
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display_name: Authelia
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## Conveyance preference controls if we collect the attestation statement including the AAGUID from the device.
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## Options are none, indirect, direct.
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attestation_conveyance_preference: indirect
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## User verification controls if the user must make a gesture or action to confirm they are present.
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## Options are required, preferred, discouraged.
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user_verification: preferred
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2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
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##
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## Duo Push API Configuration
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##
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## Parameters used to contact the Duo API. Those are generated when you protect an application of type
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## "Partner Auth API" in the management panel.
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2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
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# duo_api:
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# disable: false
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# hostname: api-123456789.example.com
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# integration_key: ABCDEF
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2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
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## Secret can also be set using a secret: https://www.authelia.com/c/secrets
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2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
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# secret_key: 1234567890abcdefghifjkl
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# enable_self_enrollment: false
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2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
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2021-09-17 04:44:35 +00:00
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##
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## NTP Configuration
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##
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## This is used to validate the servers time is accurate enough to validate TOTP.
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ntp:
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## NTP server address.
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address: "time.cloudflare.com:123"
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## NTP version.
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version: 4
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## Maximum allowed time offset between the host and the NTP server.
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max_desync: 3s
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## Disables the NTP check on startup entirely. This means Authelia will not contact a remote service at all if you
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## set this to true, and can operate in a truly offline mode.
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disable_startup_check: false
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## The default of false will prevent startup only if we can contact the NTP server and the time is out of sync with
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## the NTP server more than the configured max_desync. If you set this to true, an error will be logged but startup
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## will continue regardless of results.
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disable_failure: false
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2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
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##
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## Authentication Backend Provider Configuration
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##
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## Used for verifying user passwords and retrieve information such as email address and groups users belong to.
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##
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## The available providers are: `file`, `ldap`. You must use only one of these providers.
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2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
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authentication_backend:
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2022-06-28 07:28:49 +00:00
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2022-04-04 07:46:55 +00:00
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## Password Reset Options.
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password_reset:
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2022-06-28 03:15:50 +00:00
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## Disable both the HTML element and the API for reset password functionality.
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disable: false
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2022-04-04 07:46:55 +00:00
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## External reset password url that redirects the user to an external reset portal. This disables the internal reset
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## functionality.
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custom_url: ""
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2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
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## The amount of time to wait before we refresh data from the authentication backend. Uses duration notation.
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## To disable this feature set it to 'disable', this will slightly reduce security because for Authelia, users will
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## always belong to groups they belonged to at the time of login even if they have been removed from them in LDAP.
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## To force update on every request you can set this to '0' or 'always', this will increase processor demand.
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## See the below documentation for more information.
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2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
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## Duration Notation docs: https://www.authelia.com/c/common#duration-notation-format
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## Refresh Interval docs: https://www.authelia.com/c/1fa#refresh-interval
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2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
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refresh_interval: 5m
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2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
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##
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## LDAP (Authentication Provider)
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##
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## This is the recommended Authentication Provider in production
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## because it allows Authelia to offload the stateful operations
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## onto the LDAP service.
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2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
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# ldap:
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2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
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## The LDAP implementation, this affects elements like the attribute utilised for resetting a password.
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|
|
|
## Acceptable options are as follows:
|
2022-12-21 10:07:00 +00:00
|
|
|
## - 'activedirectory' - for Microsoft Active Directory.
|
|
|
|
## - 'freeipa' - for FreeIPA.
|
2022-12-21 10:51:25 +00:00
|
|
|
## - 'lldap' - for lldap.
|
2022-12-21 10:07:00 +00:00
|
|
|
## - 'custom' - for custom specifications of attributes and filters.
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## This currently defaults to 'custom' to maintain existing behaviour.
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## Depending on the option here certain other values in this section have a default value, notably all of the
|
|
|
|
## attribute mappings have a default value that this config overrides, you can read more about these default values
|
2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
## at https://www.authelia.com/c/ldap#defaults
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# implementation: custom
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## The url to the ldap server. Format: <scheme>://<address>[:<port>].
|
|
|
|
## Scheme can be ldap or ldaps in the format (port optional).
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# url: ldap://127.0.0.1
|
feat(session): add redis sentinel provider (#1768)
* feat(session): add redis sentinel provider
* refactor(session): use int for ports as per go standards
* refactor(configuration): adjust tests and validation
* refactor(configuration): add err format consts
* refactor(configuration): explicitly map redis structs
* refactor(session): merge redis/redis sentinel providers
* refactor(session): add additional checks to redis providers
* feat(session): add redis cluster provider
* fix: update config for new values
* fix: provide nil certpool to affected tests/mocks
* test: add additional tests to cover uncovered code
* docs: expand explanation of host and nodes relation for redis
* ci: add redis-sentinel to suite highavailability, add redis-sentinel quorum
* fix(session): sentinel password
* test: use redis alpine library image for redis sentinel, use expose instead of ports, use redis ip, adjust redis ip range, adjust redis config
* test: make entrypoint.sh executable, fix entrypoint.sh if/elif
* test: add redis failover tests
* test: defer docker start, adjust sleep, attempt logout before login, attempt visit before login and tune timeouts, add additional logging
* test: add sentinel integration test
* test: add secondary node failure to tests, fix password usage, bump test timeout, add sleep
* feat: use sentinel failover cluster
* fix: renamed addrs to sentineladdrs upstream
* test(session): sentinel failover
* test: add redis standard back into testing
* test: move redis standalone test to traefik2
* fix/docs: apply suggestions from code review
2021-03-09 23:03:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-08-05 04:30:00 +00:00
|
|
|
## The dial timeout for LDAP.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# timeout: 5s
|
2021-08-05 04:30:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## Use StartTLS with the LDAP connection.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# start_tls: false
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# tls:
|
2022-10-22 08:27:59 +00:00
|
|
|
## The server subject name to check the servers certificate against during the validation process.
|
|
|
|
## This option is not required if the certificate has a SAN which matches the host portion of the url option.
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
# server_name: ldap.example.com
|
|
|
|
|
2022-10-22 08:27:59 +00:00
|
|
|
## Skip verifying the server certificate entirely. In preference to setting this we strongly recommend you add the
|
|
|
|
## certificate or the certificate of the authority signing the certificate to the certificates directory which is
|
|
|
|
## defined by the `certificates_directory` option at the top of the configuration.
|
|
|
|
## It's important to note the public key should be added to the directory, not the private key.
|
|
|
|
## This option is strongly discouraged but may be useful in some self-signed situations where validation is not
|
|
|
|
## important to the administrator.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# skip_verify: false
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-10-22 08:27:59 +00:00
|
|
|
## Minimum TLS version for the connection.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# minimum_version: TLS1.2
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-10-22 08:27:59 +00:00
|
|
|
## Maximum TLS version for the connection.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# maximum_version: TLS1.3
|
2022-10-21 08:41:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The certificate chain used with the private_key if the server requests TLS Client Authentication
|
|
|
|
## i.e. Mutual TLS.
|
|
|
|
# certificate_chain: |
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
# MIIC5jCCAc6gAwIBAgIRAK4Sj7FiN6PXo/urPfO4E7owDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw
|
|
|
|
# EzERMA8GA1UEChMIQXV0aGVsaWEwHhcNNzAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhcNNzEwMTAxMDAw
|
|
|
|
# MDAwWjATMREwDwYDVQQKEwhBdXRoZWxpYTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP
|
|
|
|
# ADCCAQoCggEBAPKv3pSyP4ozGEiVLJ14dIWFCEGEgq7WUMI0SZZqQA2ID0L59U/Q
|
|
|
|
# /Usyy7uC9gfMUzODTpANtkOjFQcQAsxlR1FOjVBrX5QgjSvXwbQn3DtwMA7XWSl6
|
|
|
|
# LuYx2rBYSlMSN5UZQm/RxMtXfLK2b51WgEEYDFi+nECSqKzR4R54eOPkBEWRfvuY
|
|
|
|
# 91AMjlhpivg8e4JWkq4LVQUKbmiFYwIdK8XQiN4blY9WwXwJFYs5sQ/UYMwBFi0H
|
|
|
|
# kWOh7GEjfxgoUOPauIueZSMSlQp7zqAH39N0ZSYb6cS0Npj57QoWZSY3ak87ebcR
|
|
|
|
# Nf4rCvZLby7LoN7qYCKxmCaDD3x2+NYpWH8CAwEAAaM1MDMwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQD
|
|
|
|
# AgWgMBMGA1UdJQQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMBMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwDQYJKoZIhvcN
|
|
|
|
# AQELBQADggEBAHSITqIQSNzonFl3DzxHPEzr2hp6peo45buAAtu8FZHoA+U7Icfh
|
|
|
|
# /ZXjPg7Xz+hgFwM/DTNGXkMWacQA/PaNWvZspgRJf2AXvNbMSs2UQODr7Tbv+Fb4
|
|
|
|
# lyblmMUNYFMCFVAMU0eIxXAFq2qcwv8UMcQFT0Z/35s6PVOakYnAGGQjTfp5Ljuq
|
|
|
|
# wsdc/xWmM0cHWube6sdRRUD7SY20KU/kWzl8iFO0VbSSrDf1AlEhnLEkp1SPaxXg
|
|
|
|
# OdBnl98MeoramNiJ7NT6Jnyb3zZ578fjaWfThiBpagItI8GZmG4s4Ovh2JbheN8i
|
|
|
|
# ZsjNr9jqHTjhyLVbDRlmJzcqoj4JhbKs6/I^invalid DO NOT USE=
|
|
|
|
# -----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
# -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
# MIIDBDCCAeygAwIBAgIRALJsPg21kA0zY4F1wUCIuoMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw
|
|
|
|
# EzERMA8GA1UEChMIQXV0aGVsaWEwHhcNNzAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhcNNzEwMTAxMDAw
|
|
|
|
# MDAwWjATMREwDwYDVQQKEwhBdXRoZWxpYTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP
|
|
|
|
# ADCCAQoCggEBAMXHBvVxUzYk0u34/DINMSF+uiOekKOAjOrC6Mi9Ww8ytPVO7t2S
|
|
|
|
# zfTvM+XnEJqkFQFgimERfG/eGhjF9XIEY6LtnXe8ATvOK4nTwdufzBaoeQu3Gd50
|
|
|
|
# 5VXr6OHRo//ErrGvFXwP3g8xLePABsi/fkH3oDN+ztewOBMDzpd+KgTrk8ysv2ou
|
|
|
|
# kNRMKFZZqASvCgv0LD5KWvUCnL6wgf1oTXG7aztduA4oSkUP321GpOmBC5+5ElU7
|
|
|
|
# ysoRzvD12o9QJ/IfEaulIX06w9yVMo60C/h6A3U6GdkT1SiyTIqR7v7KU/IWd/Qi
|
|
|
|
# Lfftcj91VhCmJ73Meff2e2S2PrpjdXbG5FMCAwEAAaNTMFEwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQD
|
|
|
|
# AgKkMA8GA1UdJQQIMAYGBFUdJQAwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU
|
|
|
|
# Z7AtA3mzFc0InSBA5fiMfeLXA3owDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAEE5hm1mtlk/
|
|
|
|
# kviCoHH4evbpw7rxPxDftIQlqYTtvMM4eWY/6icFoSZ4fUHEWYyps8SsPu/8f2tf
|
|
|
|
# 71LGgZn0FdHi1QU2H8m0HHK7TFw+5Q6RLrLdSyk0PItJ71s9en7r8pX820nAFEHZ
|
|
|
|
# HkOSfJZ7B5hFgUDkMtVM6bardXAhoqcMk4YCU96e9d4PB4eI+xGc+mNuYvov3RbB
|
|
|
|
# D0s8ICyojeyPVLerz4wHjZu68Z5frAzhZ68YbzNs8j2fIBKKHkHyLG1iQyF+LJVj
|
|
|
|
# 2PjCP+auJsj6fQQpMGoyGtpLcSDh+ptcTngUD8JsWipzTCjmaNqdPHAOYmcgtf4b
|
|
|
|
# qocikt3WAdU^invalid DO NOT USE=
|
|
|
|
# -----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
2022-10-21 08:41:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The private key used with the certificate_chain if the server requests TLS Client Authentication
|
|
|
|
## i.e. Mutual TLS.
|
|
|
|
# private_key: |
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
|
|
|
|
# MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEA8q/elLI/ijMYSJUsnXh0hYUIQYSCrtZQwjRJlmpADYgPQvn1
|
|
|
|
# T9D9SzLLu4L2B8xTM4NOkA22Q6MVBxACzGVHUU6NUGtflCCNK9fBtCfcO3AwDtdZ
|
|
|
|
# KXou5jHasFhKUxI3lRlCb9HEy1d8srZvnVaAQRgMWL6cQJKorNHhHnh44+QERZF+
|
|
|
|
# +5j3UAyOWGmK+Dx7glaSrgtVBQpuaIVjAh0rxdCI3huVj1bBfAkVizmxD9RgzAEW
|
|
|
|
# LQeRY6HsYSN/GChQ49q4i55lIxKVCnvOoAff03RlJhvpxLQ2mPntChZlJjdqTzt5
|
|
|
|
# txE1/isK9ktvLsug3upgIrGYJoMPfHb41ilYfwIDAQABAoIBAQDTOdFf2JjHH1um
|
|
|
|
# aPgRAvNf9v7Nj5jytaRKs5nM6iNf46ls4QPreXnMhqSeSwj6lpNgBYxOgzC9Q+cc
|
|
|
|
# Y4ob/paJJPaIJTxmP8K/gyWcOQlNToL1l+eJ20eQoZm23NGr5fIsunSBwLEpTrdB
|
|
|
|
# ENqqtcwhW937K8Pxy/Q1nuLyU2bc6Tn/ivLozc8n27dpQWWKh8537VY7ancIaACr
|
|
|
|
# LJJLYxKqhQpjtBWAyCDvZQirnAOm9KnvIHaGXIswCZ4Xbsu0Y9NL+woARPyRVQvG
|
|
|
|
# jfxy4EmO9s1s6y7OObSukwKDSNihAKHx/VIbvVWx8g2Lv5fGOa+J2Y7o9Qurs8t5
|
|
|
|
# BQwMTt0BAoGBAPUw5Z32EszNepAeV3E2mPFUc5CLiqAxagZJuNDO2pKtyN29ETTR
|
|
|
|
# Ma4O1cWtGb6RqcNNN/Iukfkdk27Q5nC9VJSUUPYelOLc1WYOoUf6oKRzE72dkMQV
|
|
|
|
# R4bf6TkjD+OVR17fAfkswkGahZ5XA7j48KIQ+YC4jbnYKSxZTYyKPjH/AoGBAP1i
|
|
|
|
# tqXt36OVlP+y84wWqZSjMelBIVa9phDVGJmmhz3i1cMni8eLpJzWecA3pfnG6Tm9
|
|
|
|
# ze5M4whASleEt+M00gEvNaU9ND+z0wBfi+/DwJYIbv8PQdGrBiZFrPhTPjGQUldR
|
|
|
|
# lXccV2meeLZv7TagVxSi3DO6dSJfSEHyemd5j9mBAoGAX8Hv+0gOQZQCSOTAq8Nx
|
|
|
|
# 6dZcp9gHlNaXnMsP9eTDckOSzh636JPGvj6m+GPJSSbkURUIQ3oyokMNwFqvlNos
|
|
|
|
# fTaLhAOfjBZI9WnDTTQxpugWjphJ4HqbC67JC/qIiw5S6FdaEvGLEEoD4zoChywZ
|
|
|
|
# 9oGAn+fz2d/0/JAH/FpFPgsCgYEAp/ipZgPzziiZ9ov1wbdAQcWRj7RaWnssPFpX
|
|
|
|
# jXwEiXT3CgEMO4MJ4+KWIWOChrti3qFBg6i6lDyyS6Qyls7sLFbUdC7HlTcrOEMe
|
|
|
|
# rBoTcCI1GqZNlqWOVQ65ZIEiaI7o1vPBZo2GMQEZuq8mDKFsOMThvvTrM5cAep84
|
|
|
|
# n6HJR4ECgYABWcbsSnr0MKvVth/inxjbKapbZnp2HUCuw87Ie5zK2Of/tbC20wwk
|
|
|
|
# yKw3vrGoE3O1t1g2m2tn8UGGASeZ842jZWjIODdSi5+icysQGuULKt86h/woz2SQ
|
|
|
|
# 27GoE2i5mh6Yez6VAYbUuns3FcwIsMyWLq043Tu2DNkx9ijOOAuQzw^invalid..
|
|
|
|
# DO NOT USE==
|
|
|
|
# -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
|
2022-10-21 08:41:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## The distinguished name of the container searched for objects in the directory information tree.
|
|
|
|
## See also: additional_users_dn, additional_groups_dn.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# base_dn: dc=example,dc=com
|
feat(session): add redis sentinel provider (#1768)
* feat(session): add redis sentinel provider
* refactor(session): use int for ports as per go standards
* refactor(configuration): adjust tests and validation
* refactor(configuration): add err format consts
* refactor(configuration): explicitly map redis structs
* refactor(session): merge redis/redis sentinel providers
* refactor(session): add additional checks to redis providers
* feat(session): add redis cluster provider
* fix: update config for new values
* fix: provide nil certpool to affected tests/mocks
* test: add additional tests to cover uncovered code
* docs: expand explanation of host and nodes relation for redis
* ci: add redis-sentinel to suite highavailability, add redis-sentinel quorum
* fix(session): sentinel password
* test: use redis alpine library image for redis sentinel, use expose instead of ports, use redis ip, adjust redis ip range, adjust redis config
* test: make entrypoint.sh executable, fix entrypoint.sh if/elif
* test: add redis failover tests
* test: defer docker start, adjust sleep, attempt logout before login, attempt visit before login and tune timeouts, add additional logging
* test: add sentinel integration test
* test: add secondary node failure to tests, fix password usage, bump test timeout, add sleep
* feat: use sentinel failover cluster
* fix: renamed addrs to sentineladdrs upstream
* test(session): sentinel failover
* test: add redis standard back into testing
* test: move redis standalone test to traefik2
* fix/docs: apply suggestions from code review
2021-03-09 23:03:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## The attribute holding the username of the user. This attribute is used to populate the username in the session
|
2022-10-22 04:25:12 +00:00
|
|
|
## information. For your information, Microsoft Active Directory usually uses 'sAMAccountName' and OpenLDAP usually
|
|
|
|
## uses 'uid'. Beware that this attribute holds the unique identifiers for the users binding the user and the
|
|
|
|
## configuration stored in database. Therefore only single value attributes are allowed and the value must never be
|
|
|
|
## changed once attributed to a user otherwise it would break the configuration for that user. Technically,
|
|
|
|
## non-unique attributes like 'mail' can also be used but we don't recommend using them, we instead advise to use
|
|
|
|
## a filter to perform alternative lookups and the attributes mentioned above (sAMAccountName and uid) to
|
|
|
|
## follow https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2307.txt.
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
# username_attribute: uid
|
feat(session): add redis sentinel provider (#1768)
* feat(session): add redis sentinel provider
* refactor(session): use int for ports as per go standards
* refactor(configuration): adjust tests and validation
* refactor(configuration): add err format consts
* refactor(configuration): explicitly map redis structs
* refactor(session): merge redis/redis sentinel providers
* refactor(session): add additional checks to redis providers
* feat(session): add redis cluster provider
* fix: update config for new values
* fix: provide nil certpool to affected tests/mocks
* test: add additional tests to cover uncovered code
* docs: expand explanation of host and nodes relation for redis
* ci: add redis-sentinel to suite highavailability, add redis-sentinel quorum
* fix(session): sentinel password
* test: use redis alpine library image for redis sentinel, use expose instead of ports, use redis ip, adjust redis ip range, adjust redis config
* test: make entrypoint.sh executable, fix entrypoint.sh if/elif
* test: add redis failover tests
* test: defer docker start, adjust sleep, attempt logout before login, attempt visit before login and tune timeouts, add additional logging
* test: add sentinel integration test
* test: add secondary node failure to tests, fix password usage, bump test timeout, add sleep
* feat: use sentinel failover cluster
* fix: renamed addrs to sentineladdrs upstream
* test(session): sentinel failover
* test: add redis standard back into testing
* test: move redis standalone test to traefik2
* fix/docs: apply suggestions from code review
2021-03-09 23:03:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## The additional_users_dn is prefixed to base_dn and delimited by a comma when searching for users.
|
|
|
|
## i.e. with this set to OU=Users and base_dn set to DC=a,DC=com; OU=Users,DC=a,DC=com is searched for users.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# additional_users_dn: ou=users
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## The users filter used in search queries to find the user profile based on input filled in login form.
|
2021-08-05 04:17:07 +00:00
|
|
|
## Various placeholders are available in the user filter which you can read about in the documentation which can
|
2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
## be found at: https://www.authelia.com/c/ldap#users-filter-replacements
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## Recommended settings are as follows:
|
|
|
|
## - Microsoft Active Directory: (&({username_attribute}={input})(objectCategory=person)(objectClass=user))
|
|
|
|
## - OpenLDAP:
|
|
|
|
## - (&({username_attribute}={input})(objectClass=person))
|
|
|
|
## - (&({username_attribute}={input})(objectClass=inetOrgPerson))
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## To allow sign in both with username and email, one can use a filter like
|
|
|
|
## (&(|({username_attribute}={input})({mail_attribute}={input}))(objectClass=person))
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# users_filter: (&({username_attribute}={input})(objectClass=person))
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## The additional_groups_dn is prefixed to base_dn and delimited by a comma when searching for groups.
|
|
|
|
## i.e. with this set to OU=Groups and base_dn set to DC=a,DC=com; OU=Groups,DC=a,DC=com is searched for groups.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# additional_groups_dn: ou=groups
|
feat(session): add redis sentinel provider (#1768)
* feat(session): add redis sentinel provider
* refactor(session): use int for ports as per go standards
* refactor(configuration): adjust tests and validation
* refactor(configuration): add err format consts
* refactor(configuration): explicitly map redis structs
* refactor(session): merge redis/redis sentinel providers
* refactor(session): add additional checks to redis providers
* feat(session): add redis cluster provider
* fix: update config for new values
* fix: provide nil certpool to affected tests/mocks
* test: add additional tests to cover uncovered code
* docs: expand explanation of host and nodes relation for redis
* ci: add redis-sentinel to suite highavailability, add redis-sentinel quorum
* fix(session): sentinel password
* test: use redis alpine library image for redis sentinel, use expose instead of ports, use redis ip, adjust redis ip range, adjust redis config
* test: make entrypoint.sh executable, fix entrypoint.sh if/elif
* test: add redis failover tests
* test: defer docker start, adjust sleep, attempt logout before login, attempt visit before login and tune timeouts, add additional logging
* test: add sentinel integration test
* test: add secondary node failure to tests, fix password usage, bump test timeout, add sleep
* feat: use sentinel failover cluster
* fix: renamed addrs to sentineladdrs upstream
* test(session): sentinel failover
* test: add redis standard back into testing
* test: move redis standalone test to traefik2
* fix/docs: apply suggestions from code review
2021-03-09 23:03:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-08-05 04:17:07 +00:00
|
|
|
## The groups filter used in search queries to find the groups based on relevant authenticated user.
|
|
|
|
## Various placeholders are available in the groups filter which you can read about in the documentation which can
|
2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
## be found at: https://www.authelia.com/c/ldap#groups-filter-replacements
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## If your groups use the `groupOfUniqueNames` structure use this instead:
|
2021-08-05 04:17:07 +00:00
|
|
|
## (&(uniqueMember={dn})(objectClass=groupOfUniqueNames))
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# groups_filter: (&(member={dn})(objectClass=groupOfNames))
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## The attribute holding the name of the group.
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
# group_name_attribute: cn
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## The attribute holding the mail address of the user. If multiple email addresses are defined for a user, only the
|
|
|
|
## first one returned by the LDAP server is used.
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
# mail_attribute: mail
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## The attribute holding the display name of the user. This will be used to greet an authenticated user.
|
2021-08-05 04:17:07 +00:00
|
|
|
# display_name_attribute: displayName
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-05-02 01:51:38 +00:00
|
|
|
## Follow referrals returned by the server.
|
|
|
|
## This is especially useful for environments where read-only servers exist. Only implemented for write operations.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# permit_referrals: false
|
2022-05-02 01:51:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## The username and password of the admin user.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# user: cn=admin,dc=example,dc=com
|
2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
## Password can also be set using a secret: https://www.authelia.com/c/secrets
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# password: password
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## File (Authentication Provider)
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## With this backend, the users database is stored in a file which is updated when users reset their passwords.
|
|
|
|
## Therefore, this backend is meant to be used in a dev environment and not in production since it prevents Authelia
|
|
|
|
## to be scaled to more than one instance. The options under 'password' have sane defaults, and as it has security
|
|
|
|
## implications it is highly recommended you leave the default values. Before considering changing these settings
|
|
|
|
## please read the docs page below:
|
2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
## https://www.authelia.com/r/passwords#tuning
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
## Important: Kubernetes (or HA) users must read https://www.authelia.com/t/statelessness
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
# file:
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# path: /config/users_database.yml
|
|
|
|
# watch: false
|
|
|
|
# search:
|
|
|
|
# email: false
|
|
|
|
# case_insensitive: false
|
|
|
|
# password:
|
|
|
|
# algorithm: argon2
|
|
|
|
# argon2:
|
|
|
|
# variant: argon2id
|
|
|
|
# iterations: 3
|
|
|
|
# memory: 65536
|
|
|
|
# parallelism: 4
|
|
|
|
# key_length: 32
|
|
|
|
# salt_length: 16
|
|
|
|
# scrypt:
|
|
|
|
# iterations: 16
|
|
|
|
# block_size: 8
|
|
|
|
# parallelism: 1
|
|
|
|
# key_length: 32
|
|
|
|
# salt_length: 16
|
|
|
|
# pbkdf2:
|
|
|
|
# variant: sha512
|
|
|
|
# iterations: 310000
|
|
|
|
# salt_length: 16
|
|
|
|
# sha2crypt:
|
|
|
|
# variant: sha512
|
|
|
|
# iterations: 50000
|
|
|
|
# salt_length: 16
|
|
|
|
# bcrypt:
|
|
|
|
# variant: standard
|
|
|
|
# cost: 12
|
2022-10-17 10:51:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-04-03 00:48:26 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## Password Policy Configuration.
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
password_policy:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The standard policy allows you to tune individual settings manually.
|
|
|
|
standard:
|
|
|
|
enabled: false
|
2022-04-03 11:58:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Require a minimum length for passwords.
|
2022-04-03 00:48:26 +00:00
|
|
|
min_length: 8
|
2022-04-03 11:58:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Require a maximum length for passwords.
|
2022-04-03 00:48:26 +00:00
|
|
|
max_length: 0
|
2022-04-03 11:58:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Require uppercase characters.
|
2022-04-03 00:48:26 +00:00
|
|
|
require_uppercase: true
|
2022-04-03 11:58:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Require lowercase characters.
|
2022-04-03 00:48:26 +00:00
|
|
|
require_lowercase: true
|
2022-04-03 11:58:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Require numeric characters.
|
2022-04-03 00:48:26 +00:00
|
|
|
require_number: true
|
2022-04-03 11:58:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Require special characters.
|
2022-04-03 00:48:26 +00:00
|
|
|
require_special: true
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## zxcvbn is a well known and used password strength algorithm. It does not have tunable settings.
|
|
|
|
zxcvbn:
|
|
|
|
enabled: false
|
|
|
|
|
2022-04-15 09:30:51 +00:00
|
|
|
## Configures the minimum score allowed.
|
|
|
|
min_score: 3
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## Access Control Configuration
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## Access control is a list of rules defining the authorizations applied for one resource to users or group of users.
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## If 'access_control' is not defined, ACL rules are disabled and the 'bypass' rule is applied, i.e., access is allowed
|
|
|
|
## to anyone. Otherwise restrictions follow the rules defined.
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## Note: One can use the wildcard * to match any subdomain.
|
2022-10-01 11:47:09 +00:00
|
|
|
## It must stand at the beginning of the pattern. (example: *.example.com)
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## Note: You must put patterns containing wildcards between simple quotes for the YAML to be syntactically correct.
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## Definition: A 'rule' is an object with the following keys: 'domain', 'subject', 'policy' and 'resources'.
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## - 'domain' defines which domain or set of domains the rule applies to.
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## - 'subject' defines the subject to apply authorizations to. This parameter is optional and matching any user if not
|
|
|
|
## provided. If provided, the parameter represents either a user or a group. It should be of the form
|
|
|
|
## 'user:<username>' or 'group:<groupname>'.
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## - 'policy' is the policy to apply to resources. It must be either 'bypass', 'one_factor', 'two_factor' or 'deny'.
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## - 'resources' is a list of regular expressions that matches a set of resources to apply the policy to. This parameter
|
|
|
|
## is optional and matches any resource if not provided.
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## Note: the order of the rules is important. The first policy matching (domain, resource, subject) applies.
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
access_control:
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## Default policy can either be 'bypass', 'one_factor', 'two_factor' or 'deny'. It is the policy applied to any
|
|
|
|
## resource if there is no policy to be applied to the user.
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
default_policy: deny
|
|
|
|
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# networks:
|
|
|
|
# - name: internal
|
|
|
|
# networks:
|
|
|
|
# - 10.10.0.0/16
|
|
|
|
# - 192.168.2.0/24
|
|
|
|
# - name: VPN
|
|
|
|
# networks: 10.9.0.0/16
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# rules:
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## Rules applied to everyone
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# - domain: 'public.example.com'
|
|
|
|
# policy: bypass
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-04-01 11:38:49 +00:00
|
|
|
## Domain Regex examples. Generally we recommend just using a standard domain.
|
2022-04-02 05:41:16 +00:00
|
|
|
# - domain_regex: '^(?P<User>\w+)\.example\.com$'
|
2022-04-01 11:38:49 +00:00
|
|
|
# policy: one_factor
|
2022-04-02 05:41:16 +00:00
|
|
|
# - domain_regex: '^(?P<Group>\w+)\.example\.com$'
|
2022-04-01 11:38:49 +00:00
|
|
|
# policy: one_factor
|
|
|
|
# - domain_regex:
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# - '^appgroup-.*\.example\.com$'
|
|
|
|
# - '^appgroup2-.*\.example\.com$'
|
2022-04-01 11:38:49 +00:00
|
|
|
# policy: one_factor
|
2022-04-02 05:41:16 +00:00
|
|
|
# - domain_regex: '^.*\.example\.com$'
|
2022-04-01 11:38:49 +00:00
|
|
|
# policy: two_factor
|
|
|
|
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# - domain: 'secure.example.com'
|
|
|
|
# policy: one_factor
|
|
|
|
## Network based rule, if not provided any network matches.
|
|
|
|
# networks:
|
|
|
|
# - internal
|
|
|
|
# - VPN
|
|
|
|
# - 192.168.1.0/24
|
|
|
|
# - 10.0.0.1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# - domain:
|
|
|
|
# - 'secure.example.com'
|
|
|
|
# - 'private.example.com'
|
|
|
|
# policy: two_factor
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# - domain: 'singlefactor.example.com'
|
|
|
|
# policy: one_factor
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## Rules applied to 'admins' group
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# - domain: 'mx2.mail.example.com'
|
|
|
|
# subject: 'group:admins'
|
|
|
|
# policy: deny
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# - domain: '*.example.com'
|
|
|
|
# subject:
|
|
|
|
# - 'group:admins'
|
|
|
|
# - 'group:moderators'
|
|
|
|
# policy: two_factor
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## Rules applied to 'dev' group
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# - domain: 'dev.example.com'
|
|
|
|
# resources:
|
|
|
|
# - '^/groups/dev/.*$'
|
|
|
|
# subject: 'group:dev'
|
|
|
|
# policy: two_factor
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## Rules applied to user 'john'
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# - domain: 'dev.example.com'
|
|
|
|
# resources:
|
|
|
|
# - '^/users/john/.*$'
|
|
|
|
# subject: 'user:john'
|
|
|
|
# policy: two_factor
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## Rules applied to user 'harry'
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# - domain: 'dev.example.com'
|
|
|
|
# resources:
|
|
|
|
# - '^/users/harry/.*$'
|
|
|
|
# subject: 'user:harry'
|
|
|
|
# policy: two_factor
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## Rules applied to user 'bob'
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# - domain: '*.mail.example.com'
|
|
|
|
# subject: 'user:bob'
|
|
|
|
# policy: two_factor
|
|
|
|
# - domain: 'dev.example.com'
|
|
|
|
# resources:
|
|
|
|
# - '^/users/bob/.*$'
|
|
|
|
# subject: 'user:bob'
|
|
|
|
# policy: two_factor
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## Session Provider Configuration
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## The session cookies identify the user once logged in.
|
|
|
|
## The available providers are: `memory`, `redis`. Memory is the provider unless redis is defined.
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
session:
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## The secret to encrypt the session data. This is only used with Redis / Redis Sentinel.
|
2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
## Secret can also be set using a secret: https://www.authelia.com/c/secrets
|
2023-01-12 10:57:44 +00:00
|
|
|
secret: 'insecure_session_secret'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Cookies configures the list of allowed cookie domains for sessions to be created on.
|
|
|
|
## Undefined values will default to the values below.
|
|
|
|
# cookies:
|
|
|
|
# -
|
|
|
|
## The name of the session cookie.
|
|
|
|
# name: 'authelia_session'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The domain to protect.
|
|
|
|
## Note: the Authelia portal must also be in that domain.
|
|
|
|
# domain: 'example.com'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Optional. The fully qualified URI of the portal to redirect users to on proxies that support redirections.
|
|
|
|
## Rules:
|
|
|
|
## - MUST use the secure scheme 'https://'
|
|
|
|
## - The above domain MUST either:
|
|
|
|
## - Match the host portion of this URI.
|
|
|
|
## - Match the suffix of the host portion when prefixed with '.'.
|
|
|
|
# authelia_url: 'https://auth.example.com'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Sets the Cookie SameSite value. Possible options are none, lax, or strict.
|
|
|
|
## Please read https://www.authelia.com/c/session#same_site
|
|
|
|
# same_site: 'lax'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The value for inactivity, expiration, and remember_me are in seconds or the duration notation format.
|
|
|
|
## See: https://www.authelia.com/c/common#duration-notation-format
|
|
|
|
## All three of these values affect the cookie/session validity period. Longer periods are considered less secure
|
|
|
|
## because a stolen cookie will last longer giving attackers more time to spy or attack.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The inactivity time before the session is reset. If expiration is set to 1h, and this is set to 5m, if the user
|
|
|
|
## does not select the remember me option their session will get destroyed after 1h, or after 5m since the last
|
|
|
|
## time Authelia detected user activity.
|
|
|
|
# inactivity: '5m'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The time before the session cookie expires and the session is destroyed if remember me IS NOT selected by the
|
|
|
|
## user.
|
|
|
|
# expiration: '1h'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The time before the cookie expires and the session is destroyed if remember me IS selected by the user. Setting
|
|
|
|
## this value to -1 disables remember me for this session cookie domain.
|
|
|
|
# remember_me: '1M'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Cookie Session Domain default 'name' value. The name of the session cookie.
|
|
|
|
name: 'authelia_session'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Cookie Session Domain default 'same_site' value. Sets the Cookie SameSite value. Possible options are none, lax,
|
|
|
|
## or strict. Please read https://www.authelia.com/c/session#same_site
|
|
|
|
same_site: 'lax'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The value for inactivity, expiration, and remember_me are in seconds or the duration notation format.
|
2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
## See: https://www.authelia.com/c/common#duration-notation-format
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## All three of these values affect the cookie/session validity period. Longer periods are considered less secure
|
|
|
|
## because a stolen cookie will last longer giving attackers more time to spy or attack.
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-12 10:57:44 +00:00
|
|
|
## Cookie Session Domain default 'inactivity' value. The inactivity time before the session is reset. If expiration is
|
|
|
|
## set to 1h, and this is set to 5m, if the user does not select the remember me option their session will get
|
|
|
|
## destroyed after 1h, or after 5m since the last time Authelia detected user activity.
|
|
|
|
inactivity: '5m'
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-12 10:57:44 +00:00
|
|
|
## Cookie Session Domain default 'expiration' value. The time before the session cookie expires and the session is
|
|
|
|
## destroyed if remember me IS NOT selected by the user.
|
|
|
|
expiration: '1h'
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-12 10:57:44 +00:00
|
|
|
## Cookie Session Domain default 'remember_me' value. The time before the cookie expires and the session is destroyed
|
|
|
|
## if remember me IS selected by the user. Setting this value to -1 disables remember me for all session cookie
|
|
|
|
## domains which do not have a specific 'remember_me' value.
|
|
|
|
remember_me: '1M'
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## Redis Provider
|
|
|
|
##
|
2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
## Important: Kubernetes (or HA) users must read https://www.authelia.com/t/statelessness
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# redis:
|
|
|
|
# host: 127.0.0.1
|
|
|
|
# port: 6379
|
feat(session): add redis sentinel provider (#1768)
* feat(session): add redis sentinel provider
* refactor(session): use int for ports as per go standards
* refactor(configuration): adjust tests and validation
* refactor(configuration): add err format consts
* refactor(configuration): explicitly map redis structs
* refactor(session): merge redis/redis sentinel providers
* refactor(session): add additional checks to redis providers
* feat(session): add redis cluster provider
* fix: update config for new values
* fix: provide nil certpool to affected tests/mocks
* test: add additional tests to cover uncovered code
* docs: expand explanation of host and nodes relation for redis
* ci: add redis-sentinel to suite highavailability, add redis-sentinel quorum
* fix(session): sentinel password
* test: use redis alpine library image for redis sentinel, use expose instead of ports, use redis ip, adjust redis ip range, adjust redis config
* test: make entrypoint.sh executable, fix entrypoint.sh if/elif
* test: add redis failover tests
* test: defer docker start, adjust sleep, attempt logout before login, attempt visit before login and tune timeouts, add additional logging
* test: add sentinel integration test
* test: add secondary node failure to tests, fix password usage, bump test timeout, add sleep
* feat: use sentinel failover cluster
* fix: renamed addrs to sentineladdrs upstream
* test(session): sentinel failover
* test: add redis standard back into testing
* test: move redis standalone test to traefik2
* fix/docs: apply suggestions from code review
2021-03-09 23:03:05 +00:00
|
|
|
## Use a unix socket instead
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
# host: /var/run/redis/redis.sock
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## Username used for redis authentication. This is optional and a new feature in redis 6.0.
|
|
|
|
# username: authelia
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
## Password can also be set using a secret: https://www.authelia.com/c/secrets
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# password: authelia
|
feat(session): add redis sentinel provider (#1768)
* feat(session): add redis sentinel provider
* refactor(session): use int for ports as per go standards
* refactor(configuration): adjust tests and validation
* refactor(configuration): add err format consts
* refactor(configuration): explicitly map redis structs
* refactor(session): merge redis/redis sentinel providers
* refactor(session): add additional checks to redis providers
* feat(session): add redis cluster provider
* fix: update config for new values
* fix: provide nil certpool to affected tests/mocks
* test: add additional tests to cover uncovered code
* docs: expand explanation of host and nodes relation for redis
* ci: add redis-sentinel to suite highavailability, add redis-sentinel quorum
* fix(session): sentinel password
* test: use redis alpine library image for redis sentinel, use expose instead of ports, use redis ip, adjust redis ip range, adjust redis config
* test: make entrypoint.sh executable, fix entrypoint.sh if/elif
* test: add redis failover tests
* test: defer docker start, adjust sleep, attempt logout before login, attempt visit before login and tune timeouts, add additional logging
* test: add sentinel integration test
* test: add secondary node failure to tests, fix password usage, bump test timeout, add sleep
* feat: use sentinel failover cluster
* fix: renamed addrs to sentineladdrs upstream
* test(session): sentinel failover
* test: add redis standard back into testing
* test: move redis standalone test to traefik2
* fix/docs: apply suggestions from code review
2021-03-09 23:03:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## This is the Redis DB Index https://redis.io/commands/select (sometimes referred to as database number, DB, etc).
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# database_index: 0
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
feat(session): add redis sentinel provider (#1768)
* feat(session): add redis sentinel provider
* refactor(session): use int for ports as per go standards
* refactor(configuration): adjust tests and validation
* refactor(configuration): add err format consts
* refactor(configuration): explicitly map redis structs
* refactor(session): merge redis/redis sentinel providers
* refactor(session): add additional checks to redis providers
* feat(session): add redis cluster provider
* fix: update config for new values
* fix: provide nil certpool to affected tests/mocks
* test: add additional tests to cover uncovered code
* docs: expand explanation of host and nodes relation for redis
* ci: add redis-sentinel to suite highavailability, add redis-sentinel quorum
* fix(session): sentinel password
* test: use redis alpine library image for redis sentinel, use expose instead of ports, use redis ip, adjust redis ip range, adjust redis config
* test: make entrypoint.sh executable, fix entrypoint.sh if/elif
* test: add redis failover tests
* test: defer docker start, adjust sleep, attempt logout before login, attempt visit before login and tune timeouts, add additional logging
* test: add sentinel integration test
* test: add secondary node failure to tests, fix password usage, bump test timeout, add sleep
* feat: use sentinel failover cluster
* fix: renamed addrs to sentineladdrs upstream
* test(session): sentinel failover
* test: add redis standard back into testing
* test: move redis standalone test to traefik2
* fix/docs: apply suggestions from code review
2021-03-09 23:03:05 +00:00
|
|
|
## The maximum number of concurrent active connections to Redis.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# maximum_active_connections: 8
|
feat(session): add redis sentinel provider (#1768)
* feat(session): add redis sentinel provider
* refactor(session): use int for ports as per go standards
* refactor(configuration): adjust tests and validation
* refactor(configuration): add err format consts
* refactor(configuration): explicitly map redis structs
* refactor(session): merge redis/redis sentinel providers
* refactor(session): add additional checks to redis providers
* feat(session): add redis cluster provider
* fix: update config for new values
* fix: provide nil certpool to affected tests/mocks
* test: add additional tests to cover uncovered code
* docs: expand explanation of host and nodes relation for redis
* ci: add redis-sentinel to suite highavailability, add redis-sentinel quorum
* fix(session): sentinel password
* test: use redis alpine library image for redis sentinel, use expose instead of ports, use redis ip, adjust redis ip range, adjust redis config
* test: make entrypoint.sh executable, fix entrypoint.sh if/elif
* test: add redis failover tests
* test: defer docker start, adjust sleep, attempt logout before login, attempt visit before login and tune timeouts, add additional logging
* test: add sentinel integration test
* test: add secondary node failure to tests, fix password usage, bump test timeout, add sleep
* feat: use sentinel failover cluster
* fix: renamed addrs to sentineladdrs upstream
* test(session): sentinel failover
* test: add redis standard back into testing
* test: move redis standalone test to traefik2
* fix/docs: apply suggestions from code review
2021-03-09 23:03:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The target number of idle connections to have open ready for work. Useful when opening connections is slow.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# minimum_idle_connections: 0
|
feat(session): add redis sentinel provider (#1768)
* feat(session): add redis sentinel provider
* refactor(session): use int for ports as per go standards
* refactor(configuration): adjust tests and validation
* refactor(configuration): add err format consts
* refactor(configuration): explicitly map redis structs
* refactor(session): merge redis/redis sentinel providers
* refactor(session): add additional checks to redis providers
* feat(session): add redis cluster provider
* fix: update config for new values
* fix: provide nil certpool to affected tests/mocks
* test: add additional tests to cover uncovered code
* docs: expand explanation of host and nodes relation for redis
* ci: add redis-sentinel to suite highavailability, add redis-sentinel quorum
* fix(session): sentinel password
* test: use redis alpine library image for redis sentinel, use expose instead of ports, use redis ip, adjust redis ip range, adjust redis config
* test: make entrypoint.sh executable, fix entrypoint.sh if/elif
* test: add redis failover tests
* test: defer docker start, adjust sleep, attempt logout before login, attempt visit before login and tune timeouts, add additional logging
* test: add sentinel integration test
* test: add secondary node failure to tests, fix password usage, bump test timeout, add sleep
* feat: use sentinel failover cluster
* fix: renamed addrs to sentineladdrs upstream
* test(session): sentinel failover
* test: add redis standard back into testing
* test: move redis standalone test to traefik2
* fix/docs: apply suggestions from code review
2021-03-09 23:03:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The Redis TLS configuration. If defined will require a TLS connection to the Redis instance(s).
|
|
|
|
# tls:
|
2022-10-22 08:27:59 +00:00
|
|
|
## The server subject name to check the servers certificate against during the validation process.
|
|
|
|
## This option is not required if the certificate has a SAN which matches the host option.
|
feat(session): add redis sentinel provider (#1768)
* feat(session): add redis sentinel provider
* refactor(session): use int for ports as per go standards
* refactor(configuration): adjust tests and validation
* refactor(configuration): add err format consts
* refactor(configuration): explicitly map redis structs
* refactor(session): merge redis/redis sentinel providers
* refactor(session): add additional checks to redis providers
* feat(session): add redis cluster provider
* fix: update config for new values
* fix: provide nil certpool to affected tests/mocks
* test: add additional tests to cover uncovered code
* docs: expand explanation of host and nodes relation for redis
* ci: add redis-sentinel to suite highavailability, add redis-sentinel quorum
* fix(session): sentinel password
* test: use redis alpine library image for redis sentinel, use expose instead of ports, use redis ip, adjust redis ip range, adjust redis config
* test: make entrypoint.sh executable, fix entrypoint.sh if/elif
* test: add redis failover tests
* test: defer docker start, adjust sleep, attempt logout before login, attempt visit before login and tune timeouts, add additional logging
* test: add sentinel integration test
* test: add secondary node failure to tests, fix password usage, bump test timeout, add sleep
* feat: use sentinel failover cluster
* fix: renamed addrs to sentineladdrs upstream
* test(session): sentinel failover
* test: add redis standard back into testing
* test: move redis standalone test to traefik2
* fix/docs: apply suggestions from code review
2021-03-09 23:03:05 +00:00
|
|
|
# server_name: myredis.example.com
|
|
|
|
|
2022-10-22 08:27:59 +00:00
|
|
|
## Skip verifying the server certificate entirely. In preference to setting this we strongly recommend you add the
|
|
|
|
## certificate or the certificate of the authority signing the certificate to the certificates directory which is
|
|
|
|
## defined by the `certificates_directory` option at the top of the configuration.
|
|
|
|
## It's important to note the public key should be added to the directory, not the private key.
|
|
|
|
## This option is strongly discouraged but may be useful in some self-signed situations where validation is not
|
|
|
|
## important to the administrator.
|
feat(session): add redis sentinel provider (#1768)
* feat(session): add redis sentinel provider
* refactor(session): use int for ports as per go standards
* refactor(configuration): adjust tests and validation
* refactor(configuration): add err format consts
* refactor(configuration): explicitly map redis structs
* refactor(session): merge redis/redis sentinel providers
* refactor(session): add additional checks to redis providers
* feat(session): add redis cluster provider
* fix: update config for new values
* fix: provide nil certpool to affected tests/mocks
* test: add additional tests to cover uncovered code
* docs: expand explanation of host and nodes relation for redis
* ci: add redis-sentinel to suite highavailability, add redis-sentinel quorum
* fix(session): sentinel password
* test: use redis alpine library image for redis sentinel, use expose instead of ports, use redis ip, adjust redis ip range, adjust redis config
* test: make entrypoint.sh executable, fix entrypoint.sh if/elif
* test: add redis failover tests
* test: defer docker start, adjust sleep, attempt logout before login, attempt visit before login and tune timeouts, add additional logging
* test: add sentinel integration test
* test: add secondary node failure to tests, fix password usage, bump test timeout, add sleep
* feat: use sentinel failover cluster
* fix: renamed addrs to sentineladdrs upstream
* test(session): sentinel failover
* test: add redis standard back into testing
* test: move redis standalone test to traefik2
* fix/docs: apply suggestions from code review
2021-03-09 23:03:05 +00:00
|
|
|
# skip_verify: false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Minimum TLS version for the connection.
|
|
|
|
# minimum_version: TLS1.2
|
|
|
|
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
## Maximum TLS version for the connection.
|
|
|
|
# maximum_version: TLS1.3
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The certificate chain used with the private_key if the server requests TLS Client Authentication
|
|
|
|
## i.e. Mutual TLS.
|
|
|
|
# certificate_chain: |
|
|
|
|
# -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
# MIIC5jCCAc6gAwIBAgIRAK4Sj7FiN6PXo/urPfO4E7owDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw
|
|
|
|
# EzERMA8GA1UEChMIQXV0aGVsaWEwHhcNNzAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhcNNzEwMTAxMDAw
|
|
|
|
# MDAwWjATMREwDwYDVQQKEwhBdXRoZWxpYTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP
|
|
|
|
# ADCCAQoCggEBAPKv3pSyP4ozGEiVLJ14dIWFCEGEgq7WUMI0SZZqQA2ID0L59U/Q
|
|
|
|
# /Usyy7uC9gfMUzODTpANtkOjFQcQAsxlR1FOjVBrX5QgjSvXwbQn3DtwMA7XWSl6
|
|
|
|
# LuYx2rBYSlMSN5UZQm/RxMtXfLK2b51WgEEYDFi+nECSqKzR4R54eOPkBEWRfvuY
|
|
|
|
# 91AMjlhpivg8e4JWkq4LVQUKbmiFYwIdK8XQiN4blY9WwXwJFYs5sQ/UYMwBFi0H
|
|
|
|
# kWOh7GEjfxgoUOPauIueZSMSlQp7zqAH39N0ZSYb6cS0Npj57QoWZSY3ak87ebcR
|
|
|
|
# Nf4rCvZLby7LoN7qYCKxmCaDD3x2+NYpWH8CAwEAAaM1MDMwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQD
|
|
|
|
# AgWgMBMGA1UdJQQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMBMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwDQYJKoZIhvcN
|
|
|
|
# AQELBQADggEBAHSITqIQSNzonFl3DzxHPEzr2hp6peo45buAAtu8FZHoA+U7Icfh
|
|
|
|
# /ZXjPg7Xz+hgFwM/DTNGXkMWacQA/PaNWvZspgRJf2AXvNbMSs2UQODr7Tbv+Fb4
|
|
|
|
# lyblmMUNYFMCFVAMU0eIxXAFq2qcwv8UMcQFT0Z/35s6PVOakYnAGGQjTfp5Ljuq
|
|
|
|
# wsdc/xWmM0cHWube6sdRRUD7SY20KU/kWzl8iFO0VbSSrDf1AlEhnLEkp1SPaxXg
|
|
|
|
# OdBnl98MeoramNiJ7NT6Jnyb3zZ578fjaWfThiBpagItI8GZmG4s4Ovh2JbheN8i
|
|
|
|
# ZsjNr9jqHTjhyLVbDRlmJzcqoj4JhbKs6/I^invalid DO NOT USE=
|
|
|
|
# -----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
# -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
# MIIDBDCCAeygAwIBAgIRALJsPg21kA0zY4F1wUCIuoMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw
|
|
|
|
# EzERMA8GA1UEChMIQXV0aGVsaWEwHhcNNzAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhcNNzEwMTAxMDAw
|
|
|
|
# MDAwWjATMREwDwYDVQQKEwhBdXRoZWxpYTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP
|
|
|
|
# ADCCAQoCggEBAMXHBvVxUzYk0u34/DINMSF+uiOekKOAjOrC6Mi9Ww8ytPVO7t2S
|
|
|
|
# zfTvM+XnEJqkFQFgimERfG/eGhjF9XIEY6LtnXe8ATvOK4nTwdufzBaoeQu3Gd50
|
|
|
|
# 5VXr6OHRo//ErrGvFXwP3g8xLePABsi/fkH3oDN+ztewOBMDzpd+KgTrk8ysv2ou
|
|
|
|
# kNRMKFZZqASvCgv0LD5KWvUCnL6wgf1oTXG7aztduA4oSkUP321GpOmBC5+5ElU7
|
|
|
|
# ysoRzvD12o9QJ/IfEaulIX06w9yVMo60C/h6A3U6GdkT1SiyTIqR7v7KU/IWd/Qi
|
|
|
|
# Lfftcj91VhCmJ73Meff2e2S2PrpjdXbG5FMCAwEAAaNTMFEwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQD
|
|
|
|
# AgKkMA8GA1UdJQQIMAYGBFUdJQAwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU
|
|
|
|
# Z7AtA3mzFc0InSBA5fiMfeLXA3owDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAEE5hm1mtlk/
|
|
|
|
# kviCoHH4evbpw7rxPxDftIQlqYTtvMM4eWY/6icFoSZ4fUHEWYyps8SsPu/8f2tf
|
|
|
|
# 71LGgZn0FdHi1QU2H8m0HHK7TFw+5Q6RLrLdSyk0PItJ71s9en7r8pX820nAFEHZ
|
|
|
|
# HkOSfJZ7B5hFgUDkMtVM6bardXAhoqcMk4YCU96e9d4PB4eI+xGc+mNuYvov3RbB
|
|
|
|
# D0s8ICyojeyPVLerz4wHjZu68Z5frAzhZ68YbzNs8j2fIBKKHkHyLG1iQyF+LJVj
|
|
|
|
# 2PjCP+auJsj6fQQpMGoyGtpLcSDh+ptcTngUD8JsWipzTCjmaNqdPHAOYmcgtf4b
|
|
|
|
# qocikt3WAdU^invalid DO NOT USE=
|
|
|
|
# -----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The private key used with the certificate_chain if the server requests TLS Client Authentication
|
|
|
|
## i.e. Mutual TLS.
|
|
|
|
# private_key: |
|
|
|
|
# -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
|
|
|
|
# MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEA8q/elLI/ijMYSJUsnXh0hYUIQYSCrtZQwjRJlmpADYgPQvn1
|
|
|
|
# T9D9SzLLu4L2B8xTM4NOkA22Q6MVBxACzGVHUU6NUGtflCCNK9fBtCfcO3AwDtdZ
|
|
|
|
# KXou5jHasFhKUxI3lRlCb9HEy1d8srZvnVaAQRgMWL6cQJKorNHhHnh44+QERZF+
|
|
|
|
# +5j3UAyOWGmK+Dx7glaSrgtVBQpuaIVjAh0rxdCI3huVj1bBfAkVizmxD9RgzAEW
|
|
|
|
# LQeRY6HsYSN/GChQ49q4i55lIxKVCnvOoAff03RlJhvpxLQ2mPntChZlJjdqTzt5
|
|
|
|
# txE1/isK9ktvLsug3upgIrGYJoMPfHb41ilYfwIDAQABAoIBAQDTOdFf2JjHH1um
|
|
|
|
# aPgRAvNf9v7Nj5jytaRKs5nM6iNf46ls4QPreXnMhqSeSwj6lpNgBYxOgzC9Q+cc
|
|
|
|
# Y4ob/paJJPaIJTxmP8K/gyWcOQlNToL1l+eJ20eQoZm23NGr5fIsunSBwLEpTrdB
|
|
|
|
# ENqqtcwhW937K8Pxy/Q1nuLyU2bc6Tn/ivLozc8n27dpQWWKh8537VY7ancIaACr
|
|
|
|
# LJJLYxKqhQpjtBWAyCDvZQirnAOm9KnvIHaGXIswCZ4Xbsu0Y9NL+woARPyRVQvG
|
|
|
|
# jfxy4EmO9s1s6y7OObSukwKDSNihAKHx/VIbvVWx8g2Lv5fGOa+J2Y7o9Qurs8t5
|
|
|
|
# BQwMTt0BAoGBAPUw5Z32EszNepAeV3E2mPFUc5CLiqAxagZJuNDO2pKtyN29ETTR
|
|
|
|
# Ma4O1cWtGb6RqcNNN/Iukfkdk27Q5nC9VJSUUPYelOLc1WYOoUf6oKRzE72dkMQV
|
|
|
|
# R4bf6TkjD+OVR17fAfkswkGahZ5XA7j48KIQ+YC4jbnYKSxZTYyKPjH/AoGBAP1i
|
|
|
|
# tqXt36OVlP+y84wWqZSjMelBIVa9phDVGJmmhz3i1cMni8eLpJzWecA3pfnG6Tm9
|
|
|
|
# ze5M4whASleEt+M00gEvNaU9ND+z0wBfi+/DwJYIbv8PQdGrBiZFrPhTPjGQUldR
|
|
|
|
# lXccV2meeLZv7TagVxSi3DO6dSJfSEHyemd5j9mBAoGAX8Hv+0gOQZQCSOTAq8Nx
|
|
|
|
# 6dZcp9gHlNaXnMsP9eTDckOSzh636JPGvj6m+GPJSSbkURUIQ3oyokMNwFqvlNos
|
|
|
|
# fTaLhAOfjBZI9WnDTTQxpugWjphJ4HqbC67JC/qIiw5S6FdaEvGLEEoD4zoChywZ
|
|
|
|
# 9oGAn+fz2d/0/JAH/FpFPgsCgYEAp/ipZgPzziiZ9ov1wbdAQcWRj7RaWnssPFpX
|
|
|
|
# jXwEiXT3CgEMO4MJ4+KWIWOChrti3qFBg6i6lDyyS6Qyls7sLFbUdC7HlTcrOEMe
|
|
|
|
# rBoTcCI1GqZNlqWOVQ65ZIEiaI7o1vPBZo2GMQEZuq8mDKFsOMThvvTrM5cAep84
|
|
|
|
# n6HJR4ECgYABWcbsSnr0MKvVth/inxjbKapbZnp2HUCuw87Ie5zK2Of/tbC20wwk
|
|
|
|
# yKw3vrGoE3O1t1g2m2tn8UGGASeZ842jZWjIODdSi5+icysQGuULKt86h/woz2SQ
|
|
|
|
# 27GoE2i5mh6Yez6VAYbUuns3FcwIsMyWLq043Tu2DNkx9ijOOAuQzw^invalid..
|
|
|
|
# DO NOT USE==
|
|
|
|
# -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
|
|
|
|
|
feat(session): add redis sentinel provider (#1768)
* feat(session): add redis sentinel provider
* refactor(session): use int for ports as per go standards
* refactor(configuration): adjust tests and validation
* refactor(configuration): add err format consts
* refactor(configuration): explicitly map redis structs
* refactor(session): merge redis/redis sentinel providers
* refactor(session): add additional checks to redis providers
* feat(session): add redis cluster provider
* fix: update config for new values
* fix: provide nil certpool to affected tests/mocks
* test: add additional tests to cover uncovered code
* docs: expand explanation of host and nodes relation for redis
* ci: add redis-sentinel to suite highavailability, add redis-sentinel quorum
* fix(session): sentinel password
* test: use redis alpine library image for redis sentinel, use expose instead of ports, use redis ip, adjust redis ip range, adjust redis config
* test: make entrypoint.sh executable, fix entrypoint.sh if/elif
* test: add redis failover tests
* test: defer docker start, adjust sleep, attempt logout before login, attempt visit before login and tune timeouts, add additional logging
* test: add sentinel integration test
* test: add secondary node failure to tests, fix password usage, bump test timeout, add sleep
* feat: use sentinel failover cluster
* fix: renamed addrs to sentineladdrs upstream
* test(session): sentinel failover
* test: add redis standard back into testing
* test: move redis standalone test to traefik2
* fix/docs: apply suggestions from code review
2021-03-09 23:03:05 +00:00
|
|
|
## The Redis HA configuration options.
|
|
|
|
## This provides specific options to Redis Sentinel, sentinel_name must be defined (Master Name).
|
|
|
|
# high_availability:
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## Sentinel Name / Master Name.
|
feat(session): add redis sentinel provider (#1768)
* feat(session): add redis sentinel provider
* refactor(session): use int for ports as per go standards
* refactor(configuration): adjust tests and validation
* refactor(configuration): add err format consts
* refactor(configuration): explicitly map redis structs
* refactor(session): merge redis/redis sentinel providers
* refactor(session): add additional checks to redis providers
* feat(session): add redis cluster provider
* fix: update config for new values
* fix: provide nil certpool to affected tests/mocks
* test: add additional tests to cover uncovered code
* docs: expand explanation of host and nodes relation for redis
* ci: add redis-sentinel to suite highavailability, add redis-sentinel quorum
* fix(session): sentinel password
* test: use redis alpine library image for redis sentinel, use expose instead of ports, use redis ip, adjust redis ip range, adjust redis config
* test: make entrypoint.sh executable, fix entrypoint.sh if/elif
* test: add redis failover tests
* test: defer docker start, adjust sleep, attempt logout before login, attempt visit before login and tune timeouts, add additional logging
* test: add sentinel integration test
* test: add secondary node failure to tests, fix password usage, bump test timeout, add sleep
* feat: use sentinel failover cluster
* fix: renamed addrs to sentineladdrs upstream
* test(session): sentinel failover
* test: add redis standard back into testing
* test: move redis standalone test to traefik2
* fix/docs: apply suggestions from code review
2021-03-09 23:03:05 +00:00
|
|
|
# sentinel_name: mysentinel
|
|
|
|
|
2021-10-31 03:26:58 +00:00
|
|
|
## Specific username for Redis Sentinel. The node username and password is configured above.
|
|
|
|
# sentinel_username: sentinel_specific_user
|
|
|
|
|
feat(session): add redis sentinel provider (#1768)
* feat(session): add redis sentinel provider
* refactor(session): use int for ports as per go standards
* refactor(configuration): adjust tests and validation
* refactor(configuration): add err format consts
* refactor(configuration): explicitly map redis structs
* refactor(session): merge redis/redis sentinel providers
* refactor(session): add additional checks to redis providers
* feat(session): add redis cluster provider
* fix: update config for new values
* fix: provide nil certpool to affected tests/mocks
* test: add additional tests to cover uncovered code
* docs: expand explanation of host and nodes relation for redis
* ci: add redis-sentinel to suite highavailability, add redis-sentinel quorum
* fix(session): sentinel password
* test: use redis alpine library image for redis sentinel, use expose instead of ports, use redis ip, adjust redis ip range, adjust redis config
* test: make entrypoint.sh executable, fix entrypoint.sh if/elif
* test: add redis failover tests
* test: defer docker start, adjust sleep, attempt logout before login, attempt visit before login and tune timeouts, add additional logging
* test: add sentinel integration test
* test: add secondary node failure to tests, fix password usage, bump test timeout, add sleep
* feat: use sentinel failover cluster
* fix: renamed addrs to sentineladdrs upstream
* test(session): sentinel failover
* test: add redis standard back into testing
* test: move redis standalone test to traefik2
* fix/docs: apply suggestions from code review
2021-03-09 23:03:05 +00:00
|
|
|
## Specific password for Redis Sentinel. The node username and password is configured above.
|
|
|
|
# sentinel_password: sentinel_specific_pass
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The additional nodes to pre-seed the redis provider with (for sentinel).
|
|
|
|
## If the host in the above section is defined, it will be combined with this list to connect to sentinel.
|
|
|
|
## For high availability to be used you must have either defined; the host above or at least one node below.
|
|
|
|
# nodes:
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# - host: sentinel-node1
|
|
|
|
# port: 6379
|
|
|
|
# - host: sentinel-node2
|
|
|
|
# port: 6379
|
feat(session): add redis sentinel provider (#1768)
* feat(session): add redis sentinel provider
* refactor(session): use int for ports as per go standards
* refactor(configuration): adjust tests and validation
* refactor(configuration): add err format consts
* refactor(configuration): explicitly map redis structs
* refactor(session): merge redis/redis sentinel providers
* refactor(session): add additional checks to redis providers
* feat(session): add redis cluster provider
* fix: update config for new values
* fix: provide nil certpool to affected tests/mocks
* test: add additional tests to cover uncovered code
* docs: expand explanation of host and nodes relation for redis
* ci: add redis-sentinel to suite highavailability, add redis-sentinel quorum
* fix(session): sentinel password
* test: use redis alpine library image for redis sentinel, use expose instead of ports, use redis ip, adjust redis ip range, adjust redis config
* test: make entrypoint.sh executable, fix entrypoint.sh if/elif
* test: add redis failover tests
* test: defer docker start, adjust sleep, attempt logout before login, attempt visit before login and tune timeouts, add additional logging
* test: add sentinel integration test
* test: add secondary node failure to tests, fix password usage, bump test timeout, add sleep
* feat: use sentinel failover cluster
* fix: renamed addrs to sentineladdrs upstream
* test(session): sentinel failover
* test: add redis standard back into testing
* test: move redis standalone test to traefik2
* fix/docs: apply suggestions from code review
2021-03-09 23:03:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Choose the host with the lowest latency.
|
|
|
|
# route_by_latency: false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Choose the host randomly.
|
|
|
|
# route_randomly: false
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## Regulation Configuration
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## This mechanism prevents attackers from brute forcing the first factor. It bans the user if too many attempts are made
|
|
|
|
## in a short period of time.
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
regulation:
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## The number of failed login attempts before user is banned. Set it to 0 to disable regulation.
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
max_retries: 3
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## The time range during which the user can attempt login before being banned. The user is banned if the
|
|
|
|
## authentication failed 'max_retries' times in a 'find_time' seconds window. Find Time accepts duration notation.
|
2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
## See: https://www.authelia.com/c/common#duration-notation-format
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
find_time: 2m
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## The length of time before a banned user can login again. Ban Time accepts duration notation.
|
2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
## See: https://www.authelia.com/c/common#duration-notation-format
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
ban_time: 5m
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## Storage Provider Configuration
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## The available providers are: `local`, `mysql`, `postgres`. You must use one and only one of these providers.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# storage:
|
2021-11-25 01:56:58 +00:00
|
|
|
## The encryption key that is used to encrypt sensitive information in the database. Must be a string with a minimum
|
2022-11-25 12:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
## length of 20. Please see the docs if you configure this with an undesirable key and need to change it, you MUST use
|
|
|
|
## the CLI to change this in the database if you want to change it from a previously configured value.
|
2021-11-25 01:56:58 +00:00
|
|
|
# encryption_key: you_must_generate_a_random_string_of_more_than_twenty_chars_and_configure_this
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## Local (Storage Provider)
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## This stores the data in a SQLite3 Database.
|
|
|
|
## This is only recommended for lightweight non-stateful installations.
|
|
|
|
##
|
2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
## Important: Kubernetes (or HA) users must read https://www.authelia.com/t/statelessness
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
# local:
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
## Path to the SQLite3 Database.
|
|
|
|
# path: /config/db.sqlite3
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## MySQL / MariaDB (Storage Provider)
|
|
|
|
##
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# mysql:
|
|
|
|
# host: 127.0.0.1
|
|
|
|
# port: 3306
|
|
|
|
# database: authelia
|
|
|
|
# username: authelia
|
2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
## Password can also be set using a secret: https://www.authelia.com/c/secrets
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# password: mypassword
|
|
|
|
# timeout: 5s
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-10-22 08:27:59 +00:00
|
|
|
## MySQL TLS settings. Configuring this requires TLS.
|
|
|
|
# tls:
|
|
|
|
## The server subject name to check the servers certificate against during the validation process.
|
|
|
|
## This option is not required if the certificate has a SAN which matches the host option.
|
|
|
|
# server_name: mysql.example.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Skip verifying the server certificate entirely. In preference to setting this we strongly recommend you add the
|
|
|
|
## certificate or the certificate of the authority signing the certificate to the certificates directory which is
|
|
|
|
## defined by the `certificates_directory` option at the top of the configuration.
|
|
|
|
## It's important to note the public key should be added to the directory, not the private key.
|
|
|
|
## This option is strongly discouraged but may be useful in some self-signed situations where validation is not
|
|
|
|
## important to the administrator.
|
|
|
|
# skip_verify: false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Minimum TLS version for the connection.
|
|
|
|
# minimum_version: TLS1.2
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Maximum TLS version for the connection.
|
|
|
|
# maximum_version: TLS1.3
|
|
|
|
|
2022-10-22 20:42:19 +00:00
|
|
|
## The certificate chain used with the private_key if the server requests TLS Client Authentication
|
|
|
|
## i.e. Mutual TLS.
|
|
|
|
# certificate_chain: |
|
|
|
|
# -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
# MIIC5jCCAc6gAwIBAgIRAK4Sj7FiN6PXo/urPfO4E7owDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw
|
|
|
|
# EzERMA8GA1UEChMIQXV0aGVsaWEwHhcNNzAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhcNNzEwMTAxMDAw
|
|
|
|
# MDAwWjATMREwDwYDVQQKEwhBdXRoZWxpYTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP
|
|
|
|
# ADCCAQoCggEBAPKv3pSyP4ozGEiVLJ14dIWFCEGEgq7WUMI0SZZqQA2ID0L59U/Q
|
|
|
|
# /Usyy7uC9gfMUzODTpANtkOjFQcQAsxlR1FOjVBrX5QgjSvXwbQn3DtwMA7XWSl6
|
|
|
|
# LuYx2rBYSlMSN5UZQm/RxMtXfLK2b51WgEEYDFi+nECSqKzR4R54eOPkBEWRfvuY
|
|
|
|
# 91AMjlhpivg8e4JWkq4LVQUKbmiFYwIdK8XQiN4blY9WwXwJFYs5sQ/UYMwBFi0H
|
|
|
|
# kWOh7GEjfxgoUOPauIueZSMSlQp7zqAH39N0ZSYb6cS0Npj57QoWZSY3ak87ebcR
|
|
|
|
# Nf4rCvZLby7LoN7qYCKxmCaDD3x2+NYpWH8CAwEAAaM1MDMwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQD
|
|
|
|
# AgWgMBMGA1UdJQQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMBMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwDQYJKoZIhvcN
|
|
|
|
# AQELBQADggEBAHSITqIQSNzonFl3DzxHPEzr2hp6peo45buAAtu8FZHoA+U7Icfh
|
|
|
|
# /ZXjPg7Xz+hgFwM/DTNGXkMWacQA/PaNWvZspgRJf2AXvNbMSs2UQODr7Tbv+Fb4
|
|
|
|
# lyblmMUNYFMCFVAMU0eIxXAFq2qcwv8UMcQFT0Z/35s6PVOakYnAGGQjTfp5Ljuq
|
|
|
|
# wsdc/xWmM0cHWube6sdRRUD7SY20KU/kWzl8iFO0VbSSrDf1AlEhnLEkp1SPaxXg
|
|
|
|
# OdBnl98MeoramNiJ7NT6Jnyb3zZ578fjaWfThiBpagItI8GZmG4s4Ovh2JbheN8i
|
|
|
|
# ZsjNr9jqHTjhyLVbDRlmJzcqoj4JhbKs6/I^invalid DO NOT USE=
|
|
|
|
# -----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
# -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
# MIIDBDCCAeygAwIBAgIRALJsPg21kA0zY4F1wUCIuoMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw
|
|
|
|
# EzERMA8GA1UEChMIQXV0aGVsaWEwHhcNNzAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhcNNzEwMTAxMDAw
|
|
|
|
# MDAwWjATMREwDwYDVQQKEwhBdXRoZWxpYTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP
|
|
|
|
# ADCCAQoCggEBAMXHBvVxUzYk0u34/DINMSF+uiOekKOAjOrC6Mi9Ww8ytPVO7t2S
|
|
|
|
# zfTvM+XnEJqkFQFgimERfG/eGhjF9XIEY6LtnXe8ATvOK4nTwdufzBaoeQu3Gd50
|
|
|
|
# 5VXr6OHRo//ErrGvFXwP3g8xLePABsi/fkH3oDN+ztewOBMDzpd+KgTrk8ysv2ou
|
|
|
|
# kNRMKFZZqASvCgv0LD5KWvUCnL6wgf1oTXG7aztduA4oSkUP321GpOmBC5+5ElU7
|
|
|
|
# ysoRzvD12o9QJ/IfEaulIX06w9yVMo60C/h6A3U6GdkT1SiyTIqR7v7KU/IWd/Qi
|
|
|
|
# Lfftcj91VhCmJ73Meff2e2S2PrpjdXbG5FMCAwEAAaNTMFEwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQD
|
|
|
|
# AgKkMA8GA1UdJQQIMAYGBFUdJQAwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU
|
|
|
|
# Z7AtA3mzFc0InSBA5fiMfeLXA3owDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAEE5hm1mtlk/
|
|
|
|
# kviCoHH4evbpw7rxPxDftIQlqYTtvMM4eWY/6icFoSZ4fUHEWYyps8SsPu/8f2tf
|
|
|
|
# 71LGgZn0FdHi1QU2H8m0HHK7TFw+5Q6RLrLdSyk0PItJ71s9en7r8pX820nAFEHZ
|
|
|
|
# HkOSfJZ7B5hFgUDkMtVM6bardXAhoqcMk4YCU96e9d4PB4eI+xGc+mNuYvov3RbB
|
|
|
|
# D0s8ICyojeyPVLerz4wHjZu68Z5frAzhZ68YbzNs8j2fIBKKHkHyLG1iQyF+LJVj
|
|
|
|
# 2PjCP+auJsj6fQQpMGoyGtpLcSDh+ptcTngUD8JsWipzTCjmaNqdPHAOYmcgtf4b
|
|
|
|
# qocikt3WAdU^invalid DO NOT USE=
|
|
|
|
# -----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The private key used with the certificate_chain if the server requests TLS Client Authentication
|
|
|
|
## i.e. Mutual TLS.
|
|
|
|
# private_key: |
|
|
|
|
# -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
|
|
|
|
# MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEA8q/elLI/ijMYSJUsnXh0hYUIQYSCrtZQwjRJlmpADYgPQvn1
|
|
|
|
# T9D9SzLLu4L2B8xTM4NOkA22Q6MVBxACzGVHUU6NUGtflCCNK9fBtCfcO3AwDtdZ
|
|
|
|
# KXou5jHasFhKUxI3lRlCb9HEy1d8srZvnVaAQRgMWL6cQJKorNHhHnh44+QERZF+
|
|
|
|
# +5j3UAyOWGmK+Dx7glaSrgtVBQpuaIVjAh0rxdCI3huVj1bBfAkVizmxD9RgzAEW
|
|
|
|
# LQeRY6HsYSN/GChQ49q4i55lIxKVCnvOoAff03RlJhvpxLQ2mPntChZlJjdqTzt5
|
|
|
|
# txE1/isK9ktvLsug3upgIrGYJoMPfHb41ilYfwIDAQABAoIBAQDTOdFf2JjHH1um
|
|
|
|
# aPgRAvNf9v7Nj5jytaRKs5nM6iNf46ls4QPreXnMhqSeSwj6lpNgBYxOgzC9Q+cc
|
|
|
|
# Y4ob/paJJPaIJTxmP8K/gyWcOQlNToL1l+eJ20eQoZm23NGr5fIsunSBwLEpTrdB
|
|
|
|
# ENqqtcwhW937K8Pxy/Q1nuLyU2bc6Tn/ivLozc8n27dpQWWKh8537VY7ancIaACr
|
|
|
|
# LJJLYxKqhQpjtBWAyCDvZQirnAOm9KnvIHaGXIswCZ4Xbsu0Y9NL+woARPyRVQvG
|
|
|
|
# jfxy4EmO9s1s6y7OObSukwKDSNihAKHx/VIbvVWx8g2Lv5fGOa+J2Y7o9Qurs8t5
|
|
|
|
# BQwMTt0BAoGBAPUw5Z32EszNepAeV3E2mPFUc5CLiqAxagZJuNDO2pKtyN29ETTR
|
|
|
|
# Ma4O1cWtGb6RqcNNN/Iukfkdk27Q5nC9VJSUUPYelOLc1WYOoUf6oKRzE72dkMQV
|
|
|
|
# R4bf6TkjD+OVR17fAfkswkGahZ5XA7j48KIQ+YC4jbnYKSxZTYyKPjH/AoGBAP1i
|
|
|
|
# tqXt36OVlP+y84wWqZSjMelBIVa9phDVGJmmhz3i1cMni8eLpJzWecA3pfnG6Tm9
|
|
|
|
# ze5M4whASleEt+M00gEvNaU9ND+z0wBfi+/DwJYIbv8PQdGrBiZFrPhTPjGQUldR
|
|
|
|
# lXccV2meeLZv7TagVxSi3DO6dSJfSEHyemd5j9mBAoGAX8Hv+0gOQZQCSOTAq8Nx
|
|
|
|
# 6dZcp9gHlNaXnMsP9eTDckOSzh636JPGvj6m+GPJSSbkURUIQ3oyokMNwFqvlNos
|
|
|
|
# fTaLhAOfjBZI9WnDTTQxpugWjphJ4HqbC67JC/qIiw5S6FdaEvGLEEoD4zoChywZ
|
|
|
|
# 9oGAn+fz2d/0/JAH/FpFPgsCgYEAp/ipZgPzziiZ9ov1wbdAQcWRj7RaWnssPFpX
|
|
|
|
# jXwEiXT3CgEMO4MJ4+KWIWOChrti3qFBg6i6lDyyS6Qyls7sLFbUdC7HlTcrOEMe
|
|
|
|
# rBoTcCI1GqZNlqWOVQ65ZIEiaI7o1vPBZo2GMQEZuq8mDKFsOMThvvTrM5cAep84
|
|
|
|
# n6HJR4ECgYABWcbsSnr0MKvVth/inxjbKapbZnp2HUCuw87Ie5zK2Of/tbC20wwk
|
|
|
|
# yKw3vrGoE3O1t1g2m2tn8UGGASeZ842jZWjIODdSi5+icysQGuULKt86h/woz2SQ
|
|
|
|
# 27GoE2i5mh6Yez6VAYbUuns3FcwIsMyWLq043Tu2DNkx9ijOOAuQzw^invalid..
|
|
|
|
# DO NOT USE==
|
|
|
|
# -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
|
2022-10-22 08:27:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## PostgreSQL (Storage Provider)
|
|
|
|
##
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
# postgres:
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# host: 127.0.0.1
|
|
|
|
# port: 5432
|
|
|
|
# database: authelia
|
|
|
|
# schema: public
|
|
|
|
# username: authelia
|
|
|
|
## Password can also be set using a secret: https://www.authelia.com/c/secrets
|
|
|
|
# password: mypassword
|
|
|
|
# timeout: 5s
|
2022-10-22 08:27:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## PostgreSQL TLS settings. Configuring this requires TLS.
|
|
|
|
# tls:
|
|
|
|
## The server subject name to check the servers certificate against during the validation process.
|
|
|
|
## This option is not required if the certificate has a SAN which matches the host option.
|
|
|
|
# server_name: postgres.example.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Skip verifying the server certificate entirely. In preference to setting this we strongly recommend you add the
|
|
|
|
## certificate or the certificate of the authority signing the certificate to the certificates directory which is
|
|
|
|
## defined by the `certificates_directory` option at the top of the configuration.
|
|
|
|
## It's important to note the public key should be added to the directory, not the private key.
|
|
|
|
## This option is strongly discouraged but may be useful in some self-signed situations where validation is not
|
|
|
|
## important to the administrator.
|
|
|
|
# skip_verify: false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Minimum TLS version for the connection.
|
|
|
|
# minimum_version: TLS1.2
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Maximum TLS version for the connection.
|
|
|
|
# maximum_version: TLS1.3
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The certificate chain used with the private_key if the server requests TLS Client Authentication
|
|
|
|
## i.e. Mutual TLS.
|
|
|
|
# certificate_chain: |
|
|
|
|
# -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
# MIIC5jCCAc6gAwIBAgIRAK4Sj7FiN6PXo/urPfO4E7owDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw
|
|
|
|
# EzERMA8GA1UEChMIQXV0aGVsaWEwHhcNNzAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhcNNzEwMTAxMDAw
|
|
|
|
# MDAwWjATMREwDwYDVQQKEwhBdXRoZWxpYTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP
|
|
|
|
# ADCCAQoCggEBAPKv3pSyP4ozGEiVLJ14dIWFCEGEgq7WUMI0SZZqQA2ID0L59U/Q
|
|
|
|
# /Usyy7uC9gfMUzODTpANtkOjFQcQAsxlR1FOjVBrX5QgjSvXwbQn3DtwMA7XWSl6
|
|
|
|
# LuYx2rBYSlMSN5UZQm/RxMtXfLK2b51WgEEYDFi+nECSqKzR4R54eOPkBEWRfvuY
|
|
|
|
# 91AMjlhpivg8e4JWkq4LVQUKbmiFYwIdK8XQiN4blY9WwXwJFYs5sQ/UYMwBFi0H
|
|
|
|
# kWOh7GEjfxgoUOPauIueZSMSlQp7zqAH39N0ZSYb6cS0Npj57QoWZSY3ak87ebcR
|
|
|
|
# Nf4rCvZLby7LoN7qYCKxmCaDD3x2+NYpWH8CAwEAAaM1MDMwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQD
|
|
|
|
# AgWgMBMGA1UdJQQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMBMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwDQYJKoZIhvcN
|
|
|
|
# AQELBQADggEBAHSITqIQSNzonFl3DzxHPEzr2hp6peo45buAAtu8FZHoA+U7Icfh
|
|
|
|
# /ZXjPg7Xz+hgFwM/DTNGXkMWacQA/PaNWvZspgRJf2AXvNbMSs2UQODr7Tbv+Fb4
|
|
|
|
# lyblmMUNYFMCFVAMU0eIxXAFq2qcwv8UMcQFT0Z/35s6PVOakYnAGGQjTfp5Ljuq
|
|
|
|
# wsdc/xWmM0cHWube6sdRRUD7SY20KU/kWzl8iFO0VbSSrDf1AlEhnLEkp1SPaxXg
|
|
|
|
# OdBnl98MeoramNiJ7NT6Jnyb3zZ578fjaWfThiBpagItI8GZmG4s4Ovh2JbheN8i
|
|
|
|
# ZsjNr9jqHTjhyLVbDRlmJzcqoj4JhbKs6/I^invalid DO NOT USE=
|
|
|
|
# -----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
# -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
# MIIDBDCCAeygAwIBAgIRALJsPg21kA0zY4F1wUCIuoMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw
|
|
|
|
# EzERMA8GA1UEChMIQXV0aGVsaWEwHhcNNzAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhcNNzEwMTAxMDAw
|
|
|
|
# MDAwWjATMREwDwYDVQQKEwhBdXRoZWxpYTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP
|
|
|
|
# ADCCAQoCggEBAMXHBvVxUzYk0u34/DINMSF+uiOekKOAjOrC6Mi9Ww8ytPVO7t2S
|
|
|
|
# zfTvM+XnEJqkFQFgimERfG/eGhjF9XIEY6LtnXe8ATvOK4nTwdufzBaoeQu3Gd50
|
|
|
|
# 5VXr6OHRo//ErrGvFXwP3g8xLePABsi/fkH3oDN+ztewOBMDzpd+KgTrk8ysv2ou
|
|
|
|
# kNRMKFZZqASvCgv0LD5KWvUCnL6wgf1oTXG7aztduA4oSkUP321GpOmBC5+5ElU7
|
|
|
|
# ysoRzvD12o9QJ/IfEaulIX06w9yVMo60C/h6A3U6GdkT1SiyTIqR7v7KU/IWd/Qi
|
|
|
|
# Lfftcj91VhCmJ73Meff2e2S2PrpjdXbG5FMCAwEAAaNTMFEwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQD
|
|
|
|
# AgKkMA8GA1UdJQQIMAYGBFUdJQAwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU
|
|
|
|
# Z7AtA3mzFc0InSBA5fiMfeLXA3owDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAEE5hm1mtlk/
|
|
|
|
# kviCoHH4evbpw7rxPxDftIQlqYTtvMM4eWY/6icFoSZ4fUHEWYyps8SsPu/8f2tf
|
|
|
|
# 71LGgZn0FdHi1QU2H8m0HHK7TFw+5Q6RLrLdSyk0PItJ71s9en7r8pX820nAFEHZ
|
|
|
|
# HkOSfJZ7B5hFgUDkMtVM6bardXAhoqcMk4YCU96e9d4PB4eI+xGc+mNuYvov3RbB
|
|
|
|
# D0s8ICyojeyPVLerz4wHjZu68Z5frAzhZ68YbzNs8j2fIBKKHkHyLG1iQyF+LJVj
|
|
|
|
# 2PjCP+auJsj6fQQpMGoyGtpLcSDh+ptcTngUD8JsWipzTCjmaNqdPHAOYmcgtf4b
|
|
|
|
# qocikt3WAdU^invalid DO NOT USE=
|
|
|
|
# -----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The private key used with the certificate_chain if the server requests TLS Client Authentication
|
|
|
|
## i.e. Mutual TLS.
|
|
|
|
# private_key: |
|
|
|
|
# -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
|
|
|
|
# MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEA8q/elLI/ijMYSJUsnXh0hYUIQYSCrtZQwjRJlmpADYgPQvn1
|
|
|
|
# T9D9SzLLu4L2B8xTM4NOkA22Q6MVBxACzGVHUU6NUGtflCCNK9fBtCfcO3AwDtdZ
|
|
|
|
# KXou5jHasFhKUxI3lRlCb9HEy1d8srZvnVaAQRgMWL6cQJKorNHhHnh44+QERZF+
|
|
|
|
# +5j3UAyOWGmK+Dx7glaSrgtVBQpuaIVjAh0rxdCI3huVj1bBfAkVizmxD9RgzAEW
|
|
|
|
# LQeRY6HsYSN/GChQ49q4i55lIxKVCnvOoAff03RlJhvpxLQ2mPntChZlJjdqTzt5
|
|
|
|
# txE1/isK9ktvLsug3upgIrGYJoMPfHb41ilYfwIDAQABAoIBAQDTOdFf2JjHH1um
|
|
|
|
# aPgRAvNf9v7Nj5jytaRKs5nM6iNf46ls4QPreXnMhqSeSwj6lpNgBYxOgzC9Q+cc
|
|
|
|
# Y4ob/paJJPaIJTxmP8K/gyWcOQlNToL1l+eJ20eQoZm23NGr5fIsunSBwLEpTrdB
|
|
|
|
# ENqqtcwhW937K8Pxy/Q1nuLyU2bc6Tn/ivLozc8n27dpQWWKh8537VY7ancIaACr
|
|
|
|
# LJJLYxKqhQpjtBWAyCDvZQirnAOm9KnvIHaGXIswCZ4Xbsu0Y9NL+woARPyRVQvG
|
|
|
|
# jfxy4EmO9s1s6y7OObSukwKDSNihAKHx/VIbvVWx8g2Lv5fGOa+J2Y7o9Qurs8t5
|
|
|
|
# BQwMTt0BAoGBAPUw5Z32EszNepAeV3E2mPFUc5CLiqAxagZJuNDO2pKtyN29ETTR
|
|
|
|
# Ma4O1cWtGb6RqcNNN/Iukfkdk27Q5nC9VJSUUPYelOLc1WYOoUf6oKRzE72dkMQV
|
|
|
|
# R4bf6TkjD+OVR17fAfkswkGahZ5XA7j48KIQ+YC4jbnYKSxZTYyKPjH/AoGBAP1i
|
|
|
|
# tqXt36OVlP+y84wWqZSjMelBIVa9phDVGJmmhz3i1cMni8eLpJzWecA3pfnG6Tm9
|
|
|
|
# ze5M4whASleEt+M00gEvNaU9ND+z0wBfi+/DwJYIbv8PQdGrBiZFrPhTPjGQUldR
|
|
|
|
# lXccV2meeLZv7TagVxSi3DO6dSJfSEHyemd5j9mBAoGAX8Hv+0gOQZQCSOTAq8Nx
|
|
|
|
# 6dZcp9gHlNaXnMsP9eTDckOSzh636JPGvj6m+GPJSSbkURUIQ3oyokMNwFqvlNos
|
|
|
|
# fTaLhAOfjBZI9WnDTTQxpugWjphJ4HqbC67JC/qIiw5S6FdaEvGLEEoD4zoChywZ
|
|
|
|
# 9oGAn+fz2d/0/JAH/FpFPgsCgYEAp/ipZgPzziiZ9ov1wbdAQcWRj7RaWnssPFpX
|
|
|
|
# jXwEiXT3CgEMO4MJ4+KWIWOChrti3qFBg6i6lDyyS6Qyls7sLFbUdC7HlTcrOEMe
|
|
|
|
# rBoTcCI1GqZNlqWOVQ65ZIEiaI7o1vPBZo2GMQEZuq8mDKFsOMThvvTrM5cAep84
|
|
|
|
# n6HJR4ECgYABWcbsSnr0MKvVth/inxjbKapbZnp2HUCuw87Ie5zK2Of/tbC20wwk
|
|
|
|
# yKw3vrGoE3O1t1g2m2tn8UGGASeZ842jZWjIODdSi5+icysQGuULKt86h/woz2SQ
|
|
|
|
# 27GoE2i5mh6Yez6VAYbUuns3FcwIsMyWLq043Tu2DNkx9ijOOAuQzw^invalid..
|
|
|
|
# DO NOT USE==
|
|
|
|
# -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## Notification Provider
|
|
|
|
##
|
2022-03-03 11:20:43 +00:00
|
|
|
## Notifications are sent to users when they require a password reset, a Webauthn registration or a TOTP registration.
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## The available providers are: filesystem, smtp. You must use only one of these providers.
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
notifier:
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## You can disable the notifier startup check by setting this to true.
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
disable_startup_check: false
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## File System (Notification Provider)
|
|
|
|
##
|
2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
## Important: Kubernetes (or HA) users must read https://www.authelia.com/t/statelessness
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
# filesystem:
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# filename: /config/notification.txt
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## SMTP (Notification Provider)
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## Use a SMTP server for sending notifications. Authelia uses the PLAIN or LOGIN methods to authenticate.
|
|
|
|
## [Security] By default Authelia will:
|
|
|
|
## - force all SMTP connections over TLS including unauthenticated connections
|
|
|
|
## - use the disable_require_tls boolean value to disable this requirement
|
|
|
|
## (only works for unauthenticated connections)
|
|
|
|
## - validate the SMTP server x509 certificate during the TLS handshake against the hosts trusted certificates
|
|
|
|
## (configure in tls section)
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# smtp:
|
2021-08-10 00:52:41 +00:00
|
|
|
## The SMTP host to connect to.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# host: 127.0.0.1
|
2021-08-10 00:52:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The port to connect to the SMTP host on.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# port: 1025
|
2021-08-10 00:52:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The connection timeout.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# timeout: 5s
|
2021-08-10 00:52:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The username used for SMTP authentication.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# username: test
|
2021-08-10 00:52:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The password used for SMTP authentication.
|
2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
## Can also be set using a secret: https://www.authelia.com/c/secrets
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# password: password
|
2021-08-10 00:52:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-11-30 11:15:21 +00:00
|
|
|
## The sender is used to is used for the MAIL FROM command and the FROM header.
|
|
|
|
## If this is not defined and the username is an email, we use the username as this value. This can either be just
|
|
|
|
## an email address or the RFC5322 'Name <email address>' format.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# sender: "Authelia <admin@example.com>"
|
2021-08-10 00:52:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## HELO/EHLO Identifier. Some SMTP Servers may reject the default of localhost.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# identifier: localhost
|
2021-08-10 00:52:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## Subject configuration of the emails sent. {title} is replaced by the text from the notifier.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# subject: "[Authelia] {title}"
|
2021-08-10 00:52:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
## This address is used during the startup check to verify the email configuration is correct.
|
|
|
|
## It's not important what it is except if your email server only allows local delivery.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# startup_check_address: test@authelia.com
|
2021-08-10 00:52:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## By default we require some form of TLS. This disables this check though is not advised.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# disable_require_tls: false
|
2021-08-10 00:52:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Disables sending HTML formatted emails.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# disable_html_emails: false
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# tls:
|
2022-10-22 08:27:59 +00:00
|
|
|
## The server subject name to check the servers certificate against during the validation process.
|
|
|
|
## This option is not required if the certificate has a SAN which matches the host option.
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
# server_name: smtp.example.com
|
|
|
|
|
2022-10-22 08:27:59 +00:00
|
|
|
## Skip verifying the server certificate entirely. In preference to setting this we strongly recommend you add the
|
|
|
|
## certificate or the certificate of the authority signing the certificate to the certificates directory which is
|
|
|
|
## defined by the `certificates_directory` option at the top of the configuration.
|
|
|
|
## It's important to note the public key should be added to the directory, not the private key.
|
|
|
|
## This option is strongly discouraged but may be useful in some self-signed situations where validation is not
|
|
|
|
## important to the administrator.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# skip_verify: false
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-10-22 08:27:59 +00:00
|
|
|
## Minimum TLS version for the connection.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# minimum_version: TLS1.2
|
|
|
|
|
2022-10-22 08:27:59 +00:00
|
|
|
## Maximum TLS version for the connection.
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# maximum_version: TLS1.3
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The certificate chain used with the private_key if the server requests TLS Client Authentication
|
|
|
|
## i.e. Mutual TLS.
|
|
|
|
# certificate_chain: |
|
|
|
|
# -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
# MIIC5jCCAc6gAwIBAgIRAK4Sj7FiN6PXo/urPfO4E7owDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw
|
|
|
|
# EzERMA8GA1UEChMIQXV0aGVsaWEwHhcNNzAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhcNNzEwMTAxMDAw
|
|
|
|
# MDAwWjATMREwDwYDVQQKEwhBdXRoZWxpYTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP
|
|
|
|
# ADCCAQoCggEBAPKv3pSyP4ozGEiVLJ14dIWFCEGEgq7WUMI0SZZqQA2ID0L59U/Q
|
|
|
|
# /Usyy7uC9gfMUzODTpANtkOjFQcQAsxlR1FOjVBrX5QgjSvXwbQn3DtwMA7XWSl6
|
|
|
|
# LuYx2rBYSlMSN5UZQm/RxMtXfLK2b51WgEEYDFi+nECSqKzR4R54eOPkBEWRfvuY
|
|
|
|
# 91AMjlhpivg8e4JWkq4LVQUKbmiFYwIdK8XQiN4blY9WwXwJFYs5sQ/UYMwBFi0H
|
|
|
|
# kWOh7GEjfxgoUOPauIueZSMSlQp7zqAH39N0ZSYb6cS0Npj57QoWZSY3ak87ebcR
|
|
|
|
# Nf4rCvZLby7LoN7qYCKxmCaDD3x2+NYpWH8CAwEAAaM1MDMwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQD
|
|
|
|
# AgWgMBMGA1UdJQQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMBMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwDQYJKoZIhvcN
|
|
|
|
# AQELBQADggEBAHSITqIQSNzonFl3DzxHPEzr2hp6peo45buAAtu8FZHoA+U7Icfh
|
|
|
|
# /ZXjPg7Xz+hgFwM/DTNGXkMWacQA/PaNWvZspgRJf2AXvNbMSs2UQODr7Tbv+Fb4
|
|
|
|
# lyblmMUNYFMCFVAMU0eIxXAFq2qcwv8UMcQFT0Z/35s6PVOakYnAGGQjTfp5Ljuq
|
|
|
|
# wsdc/xWmM0cHWube6sdRRUD7SY20KU/kWzl8iFO0VbSSrDf1AlEhnLEkp1SPaxXg
|
|
|
|
# OdBnl98MeoramNiJ7NT6Jnyb3zZ578fjaWfThiBpagItI8GZmG4s4Ovh2JbheN8i
|
|
|
|
# ZsjNr9jqHTjhyLVbDRlmJzcqoj4JhbKs6/I^invalid DO NOT USE=
|
|
|
|
# -----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
# -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
# MIIDBDCCAeygAwIBAgIRALJsPg21kA0zY4F1wUCIuoMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw
|
|
|
|
# EzERMA8GA1UEChMIQXV0aGVsaWEwHhcNNzAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhcNNzEwMTAxMDAw
|
|
|
|
# MDAwWjATMREwDwYDVQQKEwhBdXRoZWxpYTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP
|
|
|
|
# ADCCAQoCggEBAMXHBvVxUzYk0u34/DINMSF+uiOekKOAjOrC6Mi9Ww8ytPVO7t2S
|
|
|
|
# zfTvM+XnEJqkFQFgimERfG/eGhjF9XIEY6LtnXe8ATvOK4nTwdufzBaoeQu3Gd50
|
|
|
|
# 5VXr6OHRo//ErrGvFXwP3g8xLePABsi/fkH3oDN+ztewOBMDzpd+KgTrk8ysv2ou
|
|
|
|
# kNRMKFZZqASvCgv0LD5KWvUCnL6wgf1oTXG7aztduA4oSkUP321GpOmBC5+5ElU7
|
|
|
|
# ysoRzvD12o9QJ/IfEaulIX06w9yVMo60C/h6A3U6GdkT1SiyTIqR7v7KU/IWd/Qi
|
|
|
|
# Lfftcj91VhCmJ73Meff2e2S2PrpjdXbG5FMCAwEAAaNTMFEwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQD
|
|
|
|
# AgKkMA8GA1UdJQQIMAYGBFUdJQAwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU
|
|
|
|
# Z7AtA3mzFc0InSBA5fiMfeLXA3owDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAEE5hm1mtlk/
|
|
|
|
# kviCoHH4evbpw7rxPxDftIQlqYTtvMM4eWY/6icFoSZ4fUHEWYyps8SsPu/8f2tf
|
|
|
|
# 71LGgZn0FdHi1QU2H8m0HHK7TFw+5Q6RLrLdSyk0PItJ71s9en7r8pX820nAFEHZ
|
|
|
|
# HkOSfJZ7B5hFgUDkMtVM6bardXAhoqcMk4YCU96e9d4PB4eI+xGc+mNuYvov3RbB
|
|
|
|
# D0s8ICyojeyPVLerz4wHjZu68Z5frAzhZ68YbzNs8j2fIBKKHkHyLG1iQyF+LJVj
|
|
|
|
# 2PjCP+auJsj6fQQpMGoyGtpLcSDh+ptcTngUD8JsWipzTCjmaNqdPHAOYmcgtf4b
|
|
|
|
# qocikt3WAdU^invalid DO NOT USE=
|
|
|
|
# -----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The private key used with the certificate_chain if the server requests TLS Client Authentication
|
|
|
|
## i.e. Mutual TLS.
|
|
|
|
# private_key: |
|
|
|
|
# -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
|
|
|
|
# MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEA8q/elLI/ijMYSJUsnXh0hYUIQYSCrtZQwjRJlmpADYgPQvn1
|
|
|
|
# T9D9SzLLu4L2B8xTM4NOkA22Q6MVBxACzGVHUU6NUGtflCCNK9fBtCfcO3AwDtdZ
|
|
|
|
# KXou5jHasFhKUxI3lRlCb9HEy1d8srZvnVaAQRgMWL6cQJKorNHhHnh44+QERZF+
|
|
|
|
# +5j3UAyOWGmK+Dx7glaSrgtVBQpuaIVjAh0rxdCI3huVj1bBfAkVizmxD9RgzAEW
|
|
|
|
# LQeRY6HsYSN/GChQ49q4i55lIxKVCnvOoAff03RlJhvpxLQ2mPntChZlJjdqTzt5
|
|
|
|
# txE1/isK9ktvLsug3upgIrGYJoMPfHb41ilYfwIDAQABAoIBAQDTOdFf2JjHH1um
|
|
|
|
# aPgRAvNf9v7Nj5jytaRKs5nM6iNf46ls4QPreXnMhqSeSwj6lpNgBYxOgzC9Q+cc
|
|
|
|
# Y4ob/paJJPaIJTxmP8K/gyWcOQlNToL1l+eJ20eQoZm23NGr5fIsunSBwLEpTrdB
|
|
|
|
# ENqqtcwhW937K8Pxy/Q1nuLyU2bc6Tn/ivLozc8n27dpQWWKh8537VY7ancIaACr
|
|
|
|
# LJJLYxKqhQpjtBWAyCDvZQirnAOm9KnvIHaGXIswCZ4Xbsu0Y9NL+woARPyRVQvG
|
|
|
|
# jfxy4EmO9s1s6y7OObSukwKDSNihAKHx/VIbvVWx8g2Lv5fGOa+J2Y7o9Qurs8t5
|
|
|
|
# BQwMTt0BAoGBAPUw5Z32EszNepAeV3E2mPFUc5CLiqAxagZJuNDO2pKtyN29ETTR
|
|
|
|
# Ma4O1cWtGb6RqcNNN/Iukfkdk27Q5nC9VJSUUPYelOLc1WYOoUf6oKRzE72dkMQV
|
|
|
|
# R4bf6TkjD+OVR17fAfkswkGahZ5XA7j48KIQ+YC4jbnYKSxZTYyKPjH/AoGBAP1i
|
|
|
|
# tqXt36OVlP+y84wWqZSjMelBIVa9phDVGJmmhz3i1cMni8eLpJzWecA3pfnG6Tm9
|
|
|
|
# ze5M4whASleEt+M00gEvNaU9ND+z0wBfi+/DwJYIbv8PQdGrBiZFrPhTPjGQUldR
|
|
|
|
# lXccV2meeLZv7TagVxSi3DO6dSJfSEHyemd5j9mBAoGAX8Hv+0gOQZQCSOTAq8Nx
|
|
|
|
# 6dZcp9gHlNaXnMsP9eTDckOSzh636JPGvj6m+GPJSSbkURUIQ3oyokMNwFqvlNos
|
|
|
|
# fTaLhAOfjBZI9WnDTTQxpugWjphJ4HqbC67JC/qIiw5S6FdaEvGLEEoD4zoChywZ
|
|
|
|
# 9oGAn+fz2d/0/JAH/FpFPgsCgYEAp/ipZgPzziiZ9ov1wbdAQcWRj7RaWnssPFpX
|
|
|
|
# jXwEiXT3CgEMO4MJ4+KWIWOChrti3qFBg6i6lDyyS6Qyls7sLFbUdC7HlTcrOEMe
|
|
|
|
# rBoTcCI1GqZNlqWOVQ65ZIEiaI7o1vPBZo2GMQEZuq8mDKFsOMThvvTrM5cAep84
|
|
|
|
# n6HJR4ECgYABWcbsSnr0MKvVth/inxjbKapbZnp2HUCuw87Ie5zK2Of/tbC20wwk
|
|
|
|
# yKw3vrGoE3O1t1g2m2tn8UGGASeZ842jZWjIODdSi5+icysQGuULKt86h/woz2SQ
|
|
|
|
# 27GoE2i5mh6Yez6VAYbUuns3FcwIsMyWLq043Tu2DNkx9ijOOAuQzw^invalid..
|
|
|
|
# DO NOT USE==
|
|
|
|
# -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
|
2021-02-21 23:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-05-04 22:06:05 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## Identity Providers
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
# identity_providers:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## OpenID Connect (Identity Provider)
|
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
## It's recommended you read the documentation before configuration of this section:
|
2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
## https://www.authelia.com/c/oidc
|
2021-05-04 22:06:05 +00:00
|
|
|
# oidc:
|
|
|
|
## The hmac_secret is used to sign OAuth2 tokens (authorization code, access tokens and refresh tokens).
|
2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
## HMAC Secret can also be set using a secret: https://www.authelia.com/c/secrets
|
2021-05-04 22:06:05 +00:00
|
|
|
# hmac_secret: this_is_a_secret_abc123abc123abc
|
|
|
|
|
2022-10-02 02:07:40 +00:00
|
|
|
## The issuer_certificate_chain is an optional PEM encoded certificate chain. It's used in conjunction with the
|
|
|
|
## issuer_private_key to sign JWT's. All certificates in the chain must be within the validity period, and every
|
|
|
|
## certificate included must be signed by the certificate immediately after it if provided.
|
|
|
|
# issuer_certificate_chain: |
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
# MIIC5jCCAc6gAwIBAgIRAK4Sj7FiN6PXo/urPfO4E7owDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw
|
|
|
|
# EzERMA8GA1UEChMIQXV0aGVsaWEwHhcNNzAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhcNNzEwMTAxMDAw
|
|
|
|
# MDAwWjATMREwDwYDVQQKEwhBdXRoZWxpYTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP
|
|
|
|
# ADCCAQoCggEBAPKv3pSyP4ozGEiVLJ14dIWFCEGEgq7WUMI0SZZqQA2ID0L59U/Q
|
|
|
|
# /Usyy7uC9gfMUzODTpANtkOjFQcQAsxlR1FOjVBrX5QgjSvXwbQn3DtwMA7XWSl6
|
|
|
|
# LuYx2rBYSlMSN5UZQm/RxMtXfLK2b51WgEEYDFi+nECSqKzR4R54eOPkBEWRfvuY
|
|
|
|
# 91AMjlhpivg8e4JWkq4LVQUKbmiFYwIdK8XQiN4blY9WwXwJFYs5sQ/UYMwBFi0H
|
|
|
|
# kWOh7GEjfxgoUOPauIueZSMSlQp7zqAH39N0ZSYb6cS0Npj57QoWZSY3ak87ebcR
|
|
|
|
# Nf4rCvZLby7LoN7qYCKxmCaDD3x2+NYpWH8CAwEAAaM1MDMwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQD
|
|
|
|
# AgWgMBMGA1UdJQQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMBMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwDQYJKoZIhvcN
|
|
|
|
# AQELBQADggEBAHSITqIQSNzonFl3DzxHPEzr2hp6peo45buAAtu8FZHoA+U7Icfh
|
|
|
|
# /ZXjPg7Xz+hgFwM/DTNGXkMWacQA/PaNWvZspgRJf2AXvNbMSs2UQODr7Tbv+Fb4
|
|
|
|
# lyblmMUNYFMCFVAMU0eIxXAFq2qcwv8UMcQFT0Z/35s6PVOakYnAGGQjTfp5Ljuq
|
|
|
|
# wsdc/xWmM0cHWube6sdRRUD7SY20KU/kWzl8iFO0VbSSrDf1AlEhnLEkp1SPaxXg
|
|
|
|
# OdBnl98MeoramNiJ7NT6Jnyb3zZ578fjaWfThiBpagItI8GZmG4s4Ovh2JbheN8i
|
|
|
|
# ZsjNr9jqHTjhyLVbDRlmJzcqoj4JhbKs6/I^invalid DO NOT USE=
|
|
|
|
# -----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
# -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
|
|
|
|
# MIIDBDCCAeygAwIBAgIRALJsPg21kA0zY4F1wUCIuoMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw
|
|
|
|
# EzERMA8GA1UEChMIQXV0aGVsaWEwHhcNNzAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhcNNzEwMTAxMDAw
|
|
|
|
# MDAwWjATMREwDwYDVQQKEwhBdXRoZWxpYTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP
|
|
|
|
# ADCCAQoCggEBAMXHBvVxUzYk0u34/DINMSF+uiOekKOAjOrC6Mi9Ww8ytPVO7t2S
|
|
|
|
# zfTvM+XnEJqkFQFgimERfG/eGhjF9XIEY6LtnXe8ATvOK4nTwdufzBaoeQu3Gd50
|
|
|
|
# 5VXr6OHRo//ErrGvFXwP3g8xLePABsi/fkH3oDN+ztewOBMDzpd+KgTrk8ysv2ou
|
|
|
|
# kNRMKFZZqASvCgv0LD5KWvUCnL6wgf1oTXG7aztduA4oSkUP321GpOmBC5+5ElU7
|
|
|
|
# ysoRzvD12o9QJ/IfEaulIX06w9yVMo60C/h6A3U6GdkT1SiyTIqR7v7KU/IWd/Qi
|
|
|
|
# Lfftcj91VhCmJ73Meff2e2S2PrpjdXbG5FMCAwEAAaNTMFEwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQD
|
|
|
|
# AgKkMA8GA1UdJQQIMAYGBFUdJQAwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU
|
|
|
|
# Z7AtA3mzFc0InSBA5fiMfeLXA3owDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAEE5hm1mtlk/
|
|
|
|
# kviCoHH4evbpw7rxPxDftIQlqYTtvMM4eWY/6icFoSZ4fUHEWYyps8SsPu/8f2tf
|
|
|
|
# 71LGgZn0FdHi1QU2H8m0HHK7TFw+5Q6RLrLdSyk0PItJ71s9en7r8pX820nAFEHZ
|
|
|
|
# HkOSfJZ7B5hFgUDkMtVM6bardXAhoqcMk4YCU96e9d4PB4eI+xGc+mNuYvov3RbB
|
|
|
|
# D0s8ICyojeyPVLerz4wHjZu68Z5frAzhZ68YbzNs8j2fIBKKHkHyLG1iQyF+LJVj
|
|
|
|
# 2PjCP+auJsj6fQQpMGoyGtpLcSDh+ptcTngUD8JsWipzTCjmaNqdPHAOYmcgtf4b
|
|
|
|
# qocikt3WAdU^invalid DO NOT USE=
|
|
|
|
# -----END CERTIFICATE-----
|
2022-10-02 02:07:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-05-04 22:06:05 +00:00
|
|
|
## The issuer_private_key is used to sign the JWT forged by OpenID Connect.
|
2022-06-15 07:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
## Issuer Private Key can also be set using a secret: https://www.authelia.com/c/secrets
|
2021-05-04 22:06:05 +00:00
|
|
|
# issuer_private_key: |
|
2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
|
|
|
|
# MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEA8q/elLI/ijMYSJUsnXh0hYUIQYSCrtZQwjRJlmpADYgPQvn1
|
|
|
|
# T9D9SzLLu4L2B8xTM4NOkA22Q6MVBxACzGVHUU6NUGtflCCNK9fBtCfcO3AwDtdZ
|
|
|
|
# KXou5jHasFhKUxI3lRlCb9HEy1d8srZvnVaAQRgMWL6cQJKorNHhHnh44+QERZF+
|
|
|
|
# +5j3UAyOWGmK+Dx7glaSrgtVBQpuaIVjAh0rxdCI3huVj1bBfAkVizmxD9RgzAEW
|
|
|
|
# LQeRY6HsYSN/GChQ49q4i55lIxKVCnvOoAff03RlJhvpxLQ2mPntChZlJjdqTzt5
|
|
|
|
# txE1/isK9ktvLsug3upgIrGYJoMPfHb41ilYfwIDAQABAoIBAQDTOdFf2JjHH1um
|
|
|
|
# aPgRAvNf9v7Nj5jytaRKs5nM6iNf46ls4QPreXnMhqSeSwj6lpNgBYxOgzC9Q+cc
|
|
|
|
# Y4ob/paJJPaIJTxmP8K/gyWcOQlNToL1l+eJ20eQoZm23NGr5fIsunSBwLEpTrdB
|
|
|
|
# ENqqtcwhW937K8Pxy/Q1nuLyU2bc6Tn/ivLozc8n27dpQWWKh8537VY7ancIaACr
|
|
|
|
# LJJLYxKqhQpjtBWAyCDvZQirnAOm9KnvIHaGXIswCZ4Xbsu0Y9NL+woARPyRVQvG
|
|
|
|
# jfxy4EmO9s1s6y7OObSukwKDSNihAKHx/VIbvVWx8g2Lv5fGOa+J2Y7o9Qurs8t5
|
|
|
|
# BQwMTt0BAoGBAPUw5Z32EszNepAeV3E2mPFUc5CLiqAxagZJuNDO2pKtyN29ETTR
|
|
|
|
# Ma4O1cWtGb6RqcNNN/Iukfkdk27Q5nC9VJSUUPYelOLc1WYOoUf6oKRzE72dkMQV
|
|
|
|
# R4bf6TkjD+OVR17fAfkswkGahZ5XA7j48KIQ+YC4jbnYKSxZTYyKPjH/AoGBAP1i
|
|
|
|
# tqXt36OVlP+y84wWqZSjMelBIVa9phDVGJmmhz3i1cMni8eLpJzWecA3pfnG6Tm9
|
|
|
|
# ze5M4whASleEt+M00gEvNaU9ND+z0wBfi+/DwJYIbv8PQdGrBiZFrPhTPjGQUldR
|
|
|
|
# lXccV2meeLZv7TagVxSi3DO6dSJfSEHyemd5j9mBAoGAX8Hv+0gOQZQCSOTAq8Nx
|
|
|
|
# 6dZcp9gHlNaXnMsP9eTDckOSzh636JPGvj6m+GPJSSbkURUIQ3oyokMNwFqvlNos
|
|
|
|
# fTaLhAOfjBZI9WnDTTQxpugWjphJ4HqbC67JC/qIiw5S6FdaEvGLEEoD4zoChywZ
|
|
|
|
# 9oGAn+fz2d/0/JAH/FpFPgsCgYEAp/ipZgPzziiZ9ov1wbdAQcWRj7RaWnssPFpX
|
|
|
|
# jXwEiXT3CgEMO4MJ4+KWIWOChrti3qFBg6i6lDyyS6Qyls7sLFbUdC7HlTcrOEMe
|
|
|
|
# rBoTcCI1GqZNlqWOVQ65ZIEiaI7o1vPBZo2GMQEZuq8mDKFsOMThvvTrM5cAep84
|
|
|
|
# n6HJR4ECgYABWcbsSnr0MKvVth/inxjbKapbZnp2HUCuw87Ie5zK2Of/tbC20wwk
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# yKw3vrGoE3O1t1g2m2tn8UGGASeZ842jZWjIODdSi5+icysQGuULKt86h/woz2SQ
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# 27GoE2i5mh6Yez6VAYbUuns3FcwIsMyWLq043Tu2DNkx9ijOOAuQzw^invalid..
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# DO NOT USE==
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# -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
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2021-05-04 22:06:05 +00:00
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feat(oidc): add additional config options, accurate token times, and refactoring (#1991)
* This gives admins more control over their OIDC installation exposing options that had defaults before. Things like lifespans for authorize codes, access tokens, id tokens, refresh tokens, a option to enable the debug client messages, minimum parameter entropy. It also allows admins to configure the response modes.
* Additionally this records specific values about a users session indicating when they performed a specific authz factor so this is represented in the token accurately.
* Lastly we also implemented a OIDC key manager which calculates the kid for jwk's using the SHA1 digest instead of being static, or more specifically the first 7 chars. As per https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key#section-8.1.1 the kid should not exceed 8 chars. While it's allowed to exceed 8 chars, it must only be done so with a compelling reason, which we do not have.
2021-07-03 23:44:30 +00:00
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## The lifespans configure the expiration for these token types.
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# access_token_lifespan: 1h
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# authorize_code_lifespan: 1m
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# id_token_lifespan: 1h
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# refresh_token_lifespan: 90m
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## Enables additional debug messages.
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# enable_client_debug_messages: false
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2022-06-17 11:03:47 +00:00
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## SECURITY NOTICE: It's not recommended changing this option and values below 8 are strongly discouraged.
|
feat(oidc): add additional config options, accurate token times, and refactoring (#1991)
* This gives admins more control over their OIDC installation exposing options that had defaults before. Things like lifespans for authorize codes, access tokens, id tokens, refresh tokens, a option to enable the debug client messages, minimum parameter entropy. It also allows admins to configure the response modes.
* Additionally this records specific values about a users session indicating when they performed a specific authz factor so this is represented in the token accurately.
* Lastly we also implemented a OIDC key manager which calculates the kid for jwk's using the SHA1 digest instead of being static, or more specifically the first 7 chars. As per https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key#section-8.1.1 the kid should not exceed 8 chars. While it's allowed to exceed 8 chars, it must only be done so with a compelling reason, which we do not have.
2021-07-03 23:44:30 +00:00
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# minimum_parameter_entropy: 8
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2022-03-02 04:44:05 +00:00
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## SECURITY NOTICE: It's not recommended changing this option, and highly discouraged to have it set to 'never'
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## for security reasons.
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# enforce_pkce: public_clients_only
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2022-04-07 00:58:51 +00:00
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## Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) settings.
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# cors:
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## List of endpoints in addition to the metadata endpoints to permit cross-origin requests on.
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# endpoints:
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2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
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# - authorization
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# - token
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# - revocation
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# - introspection
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# - userinfo
|
2022-04-07 00:58:51 +00:00
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## List of allowed origins.
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## Any origin with https is permitted unless this option is configured or the
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## allowed_origins_from_client_redirect_uris option is enabled.
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# allowed_origins:
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2022-10-21 09:17:30 +00:00
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# - https://example.com
|
2022-04-07 00:58:51 +00:00
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## Automatically adds the origin portion of all redirect URI's on all clients to the list of allowed_origins,
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## provided they have the scheme http or https and do not have the hostname of localhost.
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# allowed_origins_from_client_redirect_uris: false
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2021-05-04 22:06:05 +00:00
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## Clients is a list of known clients and their configuration.
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# clients:
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# -
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## The ID is the OpenID Connect ClientID which is used to link an application to a configuration.
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# id: myapp
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## The description to show to users when they end up on the consent screen. Defaults to the ID above.
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# description: My Application
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## The client secret is a shared secret between Authelia and the consumer of this client.
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# secret: this_is_a_secret
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|
2022-04-07 06:13:01 +00:00
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## Sector Identifiers are occasionally used to generate pairwise subject identifiers. In most cases this is not
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## necessary. Read the documentation for more information.
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## The subject identifier must be the host component of a URL, which is a domain name with an optional port.
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# sector_identifier: example.com
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|
2021-07-15 11:02:03 +00:00
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## Sets the client to public. This should typically not be set, please see the documentation for usage.
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# public: false
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|
2023-01-03 15:03:23 +00:00
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## Redirect URI's specifies a list of valid case-sensitive callbacks for this client.
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# redirect_uris:
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# - https://oidc.example.com:8080/oauth2/callback
|
2022-04-08 05:35:21 +00:00
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|
2021-07-15 11:02:03 +00:00
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## Audience this client is allowed to request.
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# audience: []
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## Scopes this client is allowed to request.
|
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|
# scopes:
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|
|
# - openid
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# - groups
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# - email
|
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# - profile
|
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|
2021-05-04 22:06:05 +00:00
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|
|
## Grant Types configures which grants this client can obtain.
|
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|
|
## It's not recommended to define this unless you know what you're doing.
|
|
|
|
# grant_types:
|
2021-07-15 11:02:03 +00:00
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|
# - refresh_token
|
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|
|
# - authorization_code
|
2021-05-04 22:06:05 +00:00
|
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|
|
## Response Types configures which responses this client can be sent.
|
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|
|
## It's not recommended to define this unless you know what you're doing.
|
|
|
|
# response_types:
|
2021-07-15 11:02:03 +00:00
|
|
|
# - code
|
feat(oidc): add additional config options, accurate token times, and refactoring (#1991)
* This gives admins more control over their OIDC installation exposing options that had defaults before. Things like lifespans for authorize codes, access tokens, id tokens, refresh tokens, a option to enable the debug client messages, minimum parameter entropy. It also allows admins to configure the response modes.
* Additionally this records specific values about a users session indicating when they performed a specific authz factor so this is represented in the token accurately.
* Lastly we also implemented a OIDC key manager which calculates the kid for jwk's using the SHA1 digest instead of being static, or more specifically the first 7 chars. As per https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key#section-8.1.1 the kid should not exceed 8 chars. While it's allowed to exceed 8 chars, it must only be done so with a compelling reason, which we do not have.
2021-07-03 23:44:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Response Modes configures which response modes this client supports.
|
|
|
|
# response_modes:
|
2021-07-15 11:02:03 +00:00
|
|
|
# - form_post
|
|
|
|
# - query
|
|
|
|
# - fragment
|
2021-07-10 04:56:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-03 15:03:23 +00:00
|
|
|
## The policy to require for this client; one_factor or two_factor.
|
|
|
|
# authorization_policy: two_factor
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Enforces the use of PKCE for this client when set to true.
|
|
|
|
# enforce_pkce: false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Enforces the use of PKCE for this client when configured, and enforces the specified challenge method.
|
|
|
|
## Options are 'plain' and 'S256'.
|
|
|
|
# pkce_challenge_method: S256
|
|
|
|
|
2021-07-10 04:56:33 +00:00
|
|
|
## The algorithm used to sign userinfo endpoint responses for this client, either none or RS256.
|
|
|
|
# userinfo_signing_algorithm: none
|
2023-01-03 15:03:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## The consent mode controls how consent is obtained.
|
|
|
|
# consent_mode: auto
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## This value controls the duration a consent on this client remains remembered when the consent mode is
|
|
|
|
## configured as 'auto' or 'pre-configured'.
|
|
|
|
# pre_configured_consent_duration: 1w
|
2021-04-11 11:25:03 +00:00
|
|
|
...
|