authelia/internal/handlers/handler_verify.go

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package handlers
import (
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/authelia/authelia/internal/authentication"
"github.com/authelia/authelia/internal/authorization"
"github.com/authelia/authelia/internal/middlewares"
"github.com/valyala/fasthttp"
)
func isURLUnderProtectedDomain(url *url.URL, domain string) bool {
return strings.HasSuffix(url.Hostname(), domain)
}
func isSchemeHTTPS(url *url.URL) bool {
return url.Scheme == "https"
}
func isSchemeWSS(url *url.URL) bool {
return url.Scheme == "wss"
}
// getOriginalURL extract the URL from the request headers (X-Original-URI or X-Forwarded-* headers).
func getOriginalURL(ctx *middlewares.AutheliaCtx) (*url.URL, error) {
originalURL := ctx.XOriginalURL()
if originalURL != nil {
url, err := url.ParseRequestURI(string(originalURL))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Unable to parse URL extracted from X-Original-URL header: %v", err)
}
ctx.Logger.Debug("Using X-Original-URL header content as targeted site URL")
return url, nil
}
forwardedProto := ctx.XForwardedProto()
forwardedHost := ctx.XForwardedHost()
forwardedURI := ctx.XForwardedURI()
if forwardedProto == nil {
return nil, errMissingXForwardedProto
}
if forwardedHost == nil {
return nil, errMissingXForwardedHost
}
var requestURI string
scheme := append(forwardedProto, protoHostSeparator...)
requestURI = string(append(scheme,
append(forwardedHost, forwardedURI...)...))
url, err := url.ParseRequestURI(requestURI)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Unable to parse URL %s: %v", requestURI, err)
}
ctx.Logger.Debugf("Using X-Fowarded-Proto, X-Forwarded-Host and X-Forwarded-URI headers " +
"to construct targeted site URL")
return url, nil
}
// parseBasicAuth parses an HTTP Basic Authentication string.
// "Basic QWxhZGRpbjpvcGVuIHNlc2FtZQ==" returns ("Aladdin", "open sesame", true).
func parseBasicAuth(auth string) (username, password string, err error) {
if !strings.HasPrefix(auth, authPrefix) {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("%s prefix not found in %s header", strings.Trim(authPrefix, " "), AuthorizationHeader)
}
c, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(auth[len(authPrefix):])
if err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
cs := string(c)
s := strings.IndexByte(cs, ':')
if s < 0 {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("Format of %s header must be user:password", AuthorizationHeader)
}
return cs[:s], cs[s+1:], nil
}
// isTargetURLAuthorized check whether the given user is authorized to access the resource.
func isTargetURLAuthorized(authorizer *authorization.Authorizer, targetURL url.URL,
username string, userGroups []string, clientIP net.IP, authLevel authentication.Level) authorizationMatching {
level := authorizer.GetRequiredLevel(authorization.Subject{
Username: username,
Groups: userGroups,
IP: clientIP,
}, targetURL)
if level == authorization.Bypass {
return Authorized
} else if username != "" && level == authorization.Denied {
// If the user is not anonymous, it means that we went through
// all the rules related to that user and knowing who he is we can
// deduce the access is forbidden.
// For anonymous users though, we cannot be sure that she
// could not be granted the rights to access the resource. Consequently
// for anonymous users we send Unauthorized instead of Forbidden.
return Forbidden
} else {
if level == authorization.OneFactor &&
authLevel >= authentication.OneFactor {
return Authorized
} else if level == authorization.TwoFactor &&
authLevel >= authentication.TwoFactor {
return Authorized
}
}
return NotAuthorized
}
// verifyBasicAuth verify that the provided username and password are correct and
// that the user is authorized to target the resource.
func verifyBasicAuth(auth []byte, targetURL url.URL, ctx *middlewares.AutheliaCtx) (username string, groups []string, authLevel authentication.Level, err error) {
username, password, err := parseBasicAuth(string(auth))
if err != nil {
return "", nil, authentication.NotAuthenticated, fmt.Errorf("Unable to parse content of %s header: %s", AuthorizationHeader, err)
}
authenticated, err := ctx.Providers.UserProvider.CheckUserPassword(username, password)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, authentication.NotAuthenticated, fmt.Errorf("Unable to check credentials extracted from %s header: %s", AuthorizationHeader, err)
}
// If the user is not correctly authenticated, send a 401.
if !authenticated {
// Request Basic Authentication otherwise
return "", nil, authentication.NotAuthenticated, fmt.Errorf("User %s is not authenticated", username)
}
details, err := ctx.Providers.UserProvider.GetDetails(username)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, authentication.NotAuthenticated, fmt.Errorf("Unable to retrieve details of user %s: %s", username, err)
}
return username, details.Groups, authentication.OneFactor, nil
}
// setForwardedHeaders set the forwarded User and Groups headers.
func setForwardedHeaders(headers *fasthttp.ResponseHeader, username string, groups []string) {
if username != "" {
headers.Set(remoteUserHeader, username)
headers.Set(remoteGroupsHeader, strings.Join(groups, ","))
}
}
// hasUserBeenInactiveLongEnough check whether the user has been inactive for too long.
func hasUserBeenInactiveLongEnough(ctx *middlewares.AutheliaCtx) (bool, error) {
maxInactivityPeriod := ctx.Configuration.Session.Inactivity
if maxInactivityPeriod == 0 {
return false, nil
}
lastActivity := ctx.GetSession().LastActivity
inactivityPeriod := ctx.Clock.Now().Unix() - lastActivity
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ctx.Logger.Tracef("Inactivity report: Inactivity=%d, MaxInactivity=%d",
inactivityPeriod, maxInactivityPeriod)
if inactivityPeriod > maxInactivityPeriod {
return true, nil
}
return false, nil
}
// verifyFromSessionCookie verify if a user identified by a cookie is allowed to access target URL.
func verifyFromSessionCookie(targetURL url.URL, ctx *middlewares.AutheliaCtx) (username string, groups []string, authLevel authentication.Level, err error) {
userSession := ctx.GetSession()
// No username in the session means the user is anonymous.
isUserAnonymous := userSession.Username == ""
if isUserAnonymous && userSession.AuthenticationLevel != authentication.NotAuthenticated {
return "", nil, authentication.NotAuthenticated, fmt.Errorf("An anonymous user cannot be authenticated. That might be the sign of a compromise")
}
if !userSession.KeepMeLoggedIn && !isUserAnonymous {
inactiveLongEnough, err := hasUserBeenInactiveLongEnough(ctx)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, authentication.NotAuthenticated, fmt.Errorf("Unable to check if user has been inactive for a long time: %s", err)
}
if inactiveLongEnough {
// Destroy the session a new one will be regenerated on next request.
err := ctx.Providers.SessionProvider.DestroySession(ctx.RequestCtx)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, authentication.NotAuthenticated, fmt.Errorf("Unable to destroy user session after long inactivity: %s", err)
}
return "", nil, authentication.NotAuthenticated, fmt.Errorf("User %s has been inactive for too long", userSession.Username)
}
}
return userSession.Username, userSession.Groups, userSession.AuthenticationLevel, nil
}
// VerifyGet is the handler verifying if a request is allowed to go through.
func VerifyGet(ctx *middlewares.AutheliaCtx) {
ctx.Logger.Tracef("Headers=%s", ctx.Request.Header.String())
targetURL, err := getOriginalURL(ctx)
if err != nil {
ctx.Error(fmt.Errorf("Unable to parse target URL: %s", err), operationFailedMessage)
return
}
if !isSchemeHTTPS(targetURL) && !isSchemeWSS(targetURL) {
ctx.Logger.Error(fmt.Errorf("Scheme of target URL %s must be secure since cookies are "+
"only transported over a secure connection for security reasons", targetURL.String()))
ctx.ReplyUnauthorized()
return
}
if !isURLUnderProtectedDomain(targetURL, ctx.Configuration.Session.Domain) {
ctx.Logger.Error(fmt.Errorf("The target URL %s is not under the protected domain %s",
targetURL.String(), ctx.Configuration.Session.Domain))
ctx.ReplyUnauthorized()
return
}
var username string
var groups []string
var authLevel authentication.Level
proxyAuthorization := ctx.Request.Header.Peek(AuthorizationHeader)
hasBasicAuth := proxyAuthorization != nil
if hasBasicAuth {
username, groups, authLevel, err = verifyBasicAuth(proxyAuthorization, *targetURL, ctx)
} else {
username, groups, authLevel, err = verifyFromSessionCookie(*targetURL, ctx)
}
if err != nil {
ctx.Logger.Error(fmt.Sprintf("Error caught when verifying user authorization: %s", err))
ctx.ReplyUnauthorized()
return
}
authorization := isTargetURLAuthorized(ctx.Providers.Authorizer, *targetURL, username,
groups, ctx.RemoteIP(), authLevel)
if authorization == Forbidden {
ctx.ReplyForbidden()
ctx.Logger.Errorf("Access to %s is forbidden to user %s", targetURL.String(), username)
return
} else if authorization == NotAuthorized {
// Kubernetes ingress controller and Traefik use the rd parameter of the verify
// endpoint to provide the URL of the login portal. The target URL of the user
// is computed from X-Fowarded-* headers or X-Original-URL.
rd := string(ctx.QueryArgs().Peek("rd"))
if rd != "" {
redirectionURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s?rd=%s", rd, url.QueryEscape(targetURL.String()))
if strings.Contains(redirectionURL, "/%23/") {
ctx.Logger.Warn("Characters /%23/ have been detected in redirection URL. This is not needed anymore, please strip it")
}
ctx.Redirect(redirectionURL, 302)
ctx.SetBodyString(fmt.Sprintf("Found. Redirecting to %s", redirectionURL))
} else {
ctx.ReplyUnauthorized()
ctx.Logger.Errorf("Access to %s is not authorized to user %s", targetURL.String(), username)
}
} else if authorization == Authorized {
setForwardedHeaders(&ctx.Response.Header, username, groups)
}
// We mark activity of the current user if he comes with a session cookie.
if !hasBasicAuth && username != "" {
// Mark current activity
userSession := ctx.GetSession()
userSession.LastActivity = time.Now().Unix()
err = ctx.SaveSession(userSession)
if err != nil {
ctx.Error(fmt.Errorf("Unable to update last activity: %s", err), operationFailedMessage)
return
}
}
}