2020-02-01 12:54:50 +00:00
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package handlers
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import (
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"fmt"
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"net/url"
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2021-11-29 03:09:14 +00:00
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"time"
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2020-02-01 12:54:50 +00:00
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2020-05-05 21:27:38 +00:00
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"github.com/valyala/fasthttp"
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2022-04-01 11:18:58 +00:00
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"github.com/authelia/authelia/v4/internal/authentication"
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2021-08-11 01:04:35 +00:00
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"github.com/authelia/authelia/v4/internal/authorization"
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"github.com/authelia/authelia/v4/internal/middlewares"
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"github.com/authelia/authelia/v4/internal/utils"
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2020-02-01 12:54:50 +00:00
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)
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feat(oidc): add additional config options, accurate token times, and refactoring (#1991)
* This gives admins more control over their OIDC installation exposing options that had defaults before. Things like lifespans for authorize codes, access tokens, id tokens, refresh tokens, a option to enable the debug client messages, minimum parameter entropy. It also allows admins to configure the response modes.
* Additionally this records specific values about a users session indicating when they performed a specific authz factor so this is represented in the token accurately.
* Lastly we also implemented a OIDC key manager which calculates the kid for jwk's using the SHA1 digest instead of being static, or more specifically the first 7 chars. As per https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key#section-8.1.1 the kid should not exceed 8 chars. While it's allowed to exceed 8 chars, it must only be done so with a compelling reason, which we do not have.
2021-07-03 23:44:30 +00:00
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// handleOIDCWorkflowResponse handle the redirection upon authentication in the OIDC workflow.
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func handleOIDCWorkflowResponse(ctx *middlewares.AutheliaCtx) {
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2021-05-04 22:06:05 +00:00
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userSession := ctx.GetSession()
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2022-04-01 11:18:58 +00:00
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if userSession.OIDCWorkflowSession.Require2FA && userSession.AuthenticationLevel != authentication.TwoFactor {
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2022-01-21 03:15:50 +00:00
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ctx.Logger.Warnf("OpenID Connect client '%s' requires 2FA, cannot be redirected yet", userSession.OIDCWorkflowSession.ClientID)
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2021-05-04 22:06:05 +00:00
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ctx.ReplyOK()
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return
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}
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2021-08-10 00:31:08 +00:00
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uri, err := ctx.ExternalRootURL()
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2021-05-04 22:06:05 +00:00
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if err != nil {
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2021-11-29 03:09:14 +00:00
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ctx.Logger.Errorf("Unable to determine external Base URL: %v", err)
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respondUnauthorized(ctx, messageOperationFailed)
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2021-05-04 22:06:05 +00:00
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return
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}
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if isConsentMissing(
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userSession.OIDCWorkflowSession,
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userSession.OIDCWorkflowSession.RequestedScopes,
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userSession.OIDCWorkflowSession.RequestedAudience) {
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2022-01-21 03:15:50 +00:00
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err = ctx.SetJSONBody(redirectResponse{Redirect: fmt.Sprintf("%s/consent", uri)})
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2021-05-04 22:06:05 +00:00
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if err != nil {
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ctx.Logger.Errorf("Unable to set default redirection URL in body: %s", err)
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}
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} else {
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2022-01-21 03:15:50 +00:00
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err = ctx.SetJSONBody(redirectResponse{Redirect: userSession.OIDCWorkflowSession.AuthURI})
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2021-05-04 22:06:05 +00:00
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if err != nil {
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ctx.Logger.Errorf("Unable to set default redirection URL in body: %s", err)
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}
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}
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}
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2020-05-02 05:06:39 +00:00
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// Handle1FAResponse handle the redirection upon 1FA authentication.
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2021-03-05 04:18:31 +00:00
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func Handle1FAResponse(ctx *middlewares.AutheliaCtx, targetURI, requestMethod string, username string, groups []string) {
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2020-02-04 21:18:02 +00:00
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if targetURI == "" {
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2020-03-06 00:31:09 +00:00
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if !ctx.Providers.Authorizer.IsSecondFactorEnabled() && ctx.Configuration.DefaultRedirectionURL != "" {
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2020-12-16 01:47:31 +00:00
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err := ctx.SetJSONBody(redirectResponse{Redirect: ctx.Configuration.DefaultRedirectionURL})
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if err != nil {
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ctx.Logger.Errorf("Unable to set default redirection URL in body: %s", err)
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}
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2020-02-04 21:18:02 +00:00
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} else {
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ctx.ReplyOK()
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2020-02-01 12:54:50 +00:00
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}
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2020-05-05 19:35:32 +00:00
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2020-02-04 21:18:02 +00:00
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return
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}
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targetURL, err := url.ParseRequestURI(targetURI)
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if err != nil {
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2021-09-17 05:53:40 +00:00
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ctx.Error(fmt.Errorf("unable to parse target URL %s: %s", targetURI, err), messageAuthenticationFailed)
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2020-02-04 21:18:02 +00:00
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return
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}
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2021-03-05 04:18:31 +00:00
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requiredLevel := ctx.Providers.Authorizer.GetRequiredLevel(
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authorization.Subject{
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Username: username,
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Groups: groups,
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IP: ctx.RemoteIP(),
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},
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authorization.NewObject(targetURL, requestMethod))
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2020-02-04 21:18:02 +00:00
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ctx.Logger.Debugf("Required level for the URL %s is %d", targetURI, requiredLevel)
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2020-04-19 11:45:46 +00:00
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if requiredLevel == authorization.TwoFactor {
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ctx.Logger.Warnf("%s requires 2FA, cannot be redirected yet", targetURI)
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2020-02-04 21:18:02 +00:00
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ctx.ReplyOK()
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2020-05-05 19:35:32 +00:00
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2020-02-04 21:18:02 +00:00
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return
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}
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safeRedirection := utils.IsRedirectionSafe(*targetURL, ctx.Configuration.Session.Domain)
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2020-02-01 12:54:50 +00:00
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2020-02-04 21:18:02 +00:00
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if !safeRedirection {
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2021-09-17 05:53:40 +00:00
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ctx.Logger.Debugf("Redirection URL %s is not safe", targetURI)
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2020-03-06 00:31:09 +00:00
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if !ctx.Providers.Authorizer.IsSecondFactorEnabled() && ctx.Configuration.DefaultRedirectionURL != "" {
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2020-12-16 01:47:31 +00:00
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err := ctx.SetJSONBody(redirectResponse{Redirect: ctx.Configuration.DefaultRedirectionURL})
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if err != nil {
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ctx.Logger.Errorf("Unable to set default redirection URL in body: %s", err)
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}
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2020-02-01 12:54:50 +00:00
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} else {
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ctx.ReplyOK()
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}
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2020-05-05 19:35:32 +00:00
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2020-02-04 21:18:02 +00:00
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return
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}
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ctx.Logger.Debugf("Redirection URL %s is safe", targetURI)
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2021-08-02 06:15:38 +00:00
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err = ctx.SetJSONBody(redirectResponse{Redirect: targetURI})
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2020-05-05 19:35:32 +00:00
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2020-12-16 01:47:31 +00:00
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if err != nil {
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ctx.Logger.Errorf("Unable to set redirection URL in body: %s", err)
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}
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2020-02-04 21:18:02 +00:00
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}
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2020-05-02 05:06:39 +00:00
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// Handle2FAResponse handle the redirection upon 2FA authentication.
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2020-02-04 21:18:02 +00:00
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func Handle2FAResponse(ctx *middlewares.AutheliaCtx, targetURI string) {
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if targetURI == "" {
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2020-02-01 12:54:50 +00:00
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if ctx.Configuration.DefaultRedirectionURL != "" {
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2020-12-16 01:47:31 +00:00
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err := ctx.SetJSONBody(redirectResponse{Redirect: ctx.Configuration.DefaultRedirectionURL})
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if err != nil {
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ctx.Logger.Errorf("Unable to set default redirection URL in body: %s", err)
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}
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2020-02-01 12:54:50 +00:00
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} else {
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ctx.ReplyOK()
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}
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2020-05-05 19:35:32 +00:00
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2020-02-04 21:18:02 +00:00
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return
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}
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2021-08-02 06:15:38 +00:00
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safe, err := utils.IsRedirectionURISafe(targetURI, ctx.Configuration.Session.Domain)
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2020-02-04 21:18:02 +00:00
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if err != nil {
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2021-09-17 05:53:40 +00:00
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ctx.Error(fmt.Errorf("unable to check target URL: %s", err), messageMFAValidationFailed)
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2020-02-04 21:18:02 +00:00
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return
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}
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2021-08-02 06:15:38 +00:00
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if safe {
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ctx.Logger.Debugf("Redirection URL %s is safe", targetURI)
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2020-12-16 01:47:31 +00:00
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err := ctx.SetJSONBody(redirectResponse{Redirect: targetURI})
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2021-08-02 06:15:38 +00:00
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2020-12-16 01:47:31 +00:00
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if err != nil {
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ctx.Logger.Errorf("Unable to set redirection URL in body: %s", err)
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}
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2020-02-04 21:18:02 +00:00
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} else {
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ctx.ReplyOK()
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2020-02-01 12:54:50 +00:00
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}
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}
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2020-05-05 21:27:38 +00:00
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2021-11-29 03:09:14 +00:00
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func markAuthenticationAttempt(ctx *middlewares.AutheliaCtx, successful bool, bannedUntil *time.Time, username string, authType string, errAuth error) (err error) {
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// We only Mark if there was no underlying error.
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ctx.Logger.Debugf("Mark %s authentication attempt made by user '%s'", authType, username)
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2021-12-02 02:21:46 +00:00
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var (
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requestURI, requestMethod string
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)
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referer := ctx.Request.Header.Referer()
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if referer != nil {
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refererURL, err := url.Parse(string(referer))
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if err == nil {
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requestURI = refererURL.Query().Get("rd")
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requestMethod = refererURL.Query().Get("rm")
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}
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}
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if err = ctx.Providers.Regulator.Mark(ctx, successful, bannedUntil != nil, username, requestURI, requestMethod, authType, ctx.RemoteIP()); err != nil {
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2021-11-29 03:09:14 +00:00
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ctx.Logger.Errorf("Unable to mark %s authentication attempt by user '%s': %+v", authType, username, err)
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return err
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}
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if successful {
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ctx.Logger.Debugf("Successful %s authentication attempt made by user '%s'", authType, username)
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} else {
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switch {
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case errAuth != nil:
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ctx.Logger.Errorf("Unsuccessful %s authentication attempt by user '%s': %+v", authType, username, errAuth)
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case bannedUntil != nil:
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ctx.Logger.Errorf("Unsuccessful %s authentication attempt by user '%s' and they are banned until %s", authType, username, bannedUntil)
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default:
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ctx.Logger.Errorf("Unsuccessful %s authentication attempt by user '%s'", authType, username)
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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func respondUnauthorized(ctx *middlewares.AutheliaCtx, message string) {
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2020-05-05 21:27:38 +00:00
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ctx.SetStatusCode(fasthttp.StatusUnauthorized)
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2021-11-29 03:09:14 +00:00
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ctx.SetJSONError(message)
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2020-05-05 21:27:38 +00:00
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}
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